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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to introduce readers to the law governing name suppression in ew 
Zealand and highlights pressing issues in this area of law. Particular attention is given 
to the operation of the court's discretion to order name suppression under section 140 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1985. It is argued that inconsistent weight is attributed to 
the presumption of innocence in interim name suppression applications in the lower 
courts. There is a clear tension between the courts' insistence that no one receives 
favourable tension before the law, and their readiness to suppress celebrities' names. 
The paper also argues that courts often neglect to assess whether name suppression is 
a justified limitation on the right to freedom of expression. The media has an 
important role to play in name suppression applications and their role in proceedings 
are out I ined, as are the challenges that courts face to name suppression orders from 
the internet. It is argued that the continued availability of discretion is necessary for 
judges, but that judicial training may be warranted. To gain greater consistency in 
pre-trial suppression all defendants should receive suppression until the charges have 
been "gone into' by the court. In such a case, freedom of expression is delayed and 
not destroyed. 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract. table of contents. footnotes. bibliography 
and appendices) comprises approximately 16. 90 I words. 
Name Suppression-Criminal Justice Act. section 140-Freedom of Expression 
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I INTRODUCTION 
"Anger at All Black suppression'', 1 " Disturbing Caller not named",2 "High 
Ranking man' s name suppressed in sex case."3 Such headlines are currently 
bombarding New Zealand newspapers on a daily basis. provoking controversy about 
the granting of name suppression to defendants in criminal proceedings. ame 
suppression infringes society's right to be fully informed about the workings of their 
public institutions-I and restricts the liberty of freedom of expression.5 Indeed to some. 
·'[t]he most egregious suppression of free speech in New Zealand today is name 
suppression."6 Name suppression is also viewed as a reduction of the expected cost in 
committing a criminal offence, as it prohibits publicity of an offender's actions7 and 
consequently presents a fa<;:ade to the pub! ic of an offender· s true character. 
Because of these reasons, the Court of Appeal has made it clear that the 
discretion to suppress should only be exercised in situations where the harm which 
would be caused by publicity. is disproportionate to the public interest in disclosure 
and the freedom to receive information of any kind.8 This paper seeks to illustrate 
how consistently the Court of Appeal's directions are being followed in the lower 
courts, amid allegations that name suppression is both inconsistent in application9 and 
given too readily to celebrities. 10 
This paper opens by canvassing the competing rights the courts must balance 
111 name suppression applications. The case law suggests that too little attention is 
1 '"A nger at All Black Suppression" ( I O December 2004) <http :/ tvnz.co.nz> (last accessed 23 May 2005). 
" John Henzel I ··Disturbing Ca ller not named" ( 15 January 2005) The Press Christchurch Local Ne\vs. 
3 Tony Wall and Emily Watt ··High Ranking man's name suppressed in sex case" (19 December 200-l) The 
S11ndm· Star Times Auckland. 
4 MvPolice(1991)8CR Z 14.15(HC)FisherJ. 
5 This right is guaranteed in section 14 of the I ew Zealand Bi 11 of Ri ghts Act 1990. 
6 Bernard Robertson ""Internet; Gi\ ing you info your govern ment doesn't want) ou to have·· (7 Apri I 1995) 
The Independent Auckland 9. 
7 Robertson. above n 6. 9. 
8 Le11'1·s v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZL R 546. para 68 (CA) El ias CJ for the Court. 
<> '"Name suppression to easily granted-law expert" (5 March 2005) StuffNZPA National ev\ s 
<http ://www.stuff.co.n z> (last accessed 23 May 2005). N ico la Boyes .. Legal ad\ isers fm our secrecy" (31 
August '.W05) The Nell' Zealand Hemld Auck land 'ews A2. 
10 Bo) es, abO\ e n 9, A2. 
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given to freedom of expression. The paper outlines the statutory provisions dealing 
with name suppression and the factors which are commonly raised in support of 
suppression. Particular attention is given to the varying weight judges accord the 
presumption of innocence in interim name suppression applications, which leads to 
inconsistent results. Consideration is also given to the clear tension between the 
courts' continued insistence that no class of people receives preferential treatment 
before the law and their constant suppression of the names of ce lebrities. The crucial 
role of the media in name suppression cases is also highlighted. The increasing 
problems associated with the internet warrant discussion. as name suppressions orders 
are being breached by internet users in ew Zealand and abroad, raising questions 
about their usefulness. To some, name suppression is soon to be a ·'dead letter', 
because of the internet's increasing pervasiveness. 11 Proposed reform options are also 
critiqued. 
This paper argues that name suppression should continue to be available. as in 
certain circumstances it is both necessary and desirable . However. cou11s need to be 
more thorough in their analysis of whether the harm caused by publicity is truly 
disproportionate to the need for open justice and uninhibited expression. In all other 
circumstances, the principle should be to name and shame defendants who have 
committed criminal acts. 
II THE COMPETING RIGHTS 
The courts have the power to suppress the publication of evidence, 
submissions and names. 12 Similar considerations app ly to suppression of name and of 
evidence, but name suppression "is the aspect which arises most often and create 
most problems in practice." 13 When Courts receive such applications for name 
suppression, there must be a balancing of competing private and public rights. 14 
11 Robertson, above n 6. 9. 
i::, Criminal Justice et 1985. ss 138-1-+0 . 
11 John Burrows and Bill Wil son ··Media Law" Nev\ Zealand Lav, Soci et) Seminar (April 2003) 17. 
14 Lewis ,. Wilson & 1/orton Ltd, above n 8, 559 Elias CJ for the Court. 
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A Open Justice- "Publicity is the soul ofjustice"15 
The principle of open justice. which states that ·'justice must not only be done, 
it must manifestly be seen to be done" is a powerful starting point when considering 
suppression applications. 16 This principle of openness states that a hearing should 
take place in open court and that members of the public (including reporters) have the 
right to be present. 17 The Bill of Rights affirms this principle by providing that a 
person charged with an offence has a right to a ··fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial court." 18 The principle also gives the media a common law 
right to report proceedings. 19 
The rationale of the principle is that publicity acts as an aid to justice, 
accentuating accountability. As the prominent ew Zealand educationalist Jack 
Shallcrass said: ··At the heart of democratic societies is the belief that free access to 
knowledge. information and opinion through the media is the only defence against 
tyrannies of all kinds.'"20 Name suppression offends against the media's ability to 
report completely about proceedings, as the names of those involved remain 
concealed. 
In criminal proceedings it is said that the openness principle carries its greatest 
force, as it is necessary to reflect the immense power over the individual's freedom 
which the state has by virtue of the criminal law. 21 A social contract exists between 
citizen and state: 22 
When a person commits a crime that person technically commits a crime against the 
State and not the victim of the crime. Citizens have, in effect, given over their 
1
' John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Lmv in New Zealand (5ed , Oxford, Melbourne, 2005) 325. 
16 Burrows and Cheer, above n 15, 325. 
17 A-G Le1·e//er Maga::ine Ltd [ 1979) I Al I ER 745. 749-750 (HL) Lord Diplock. 
18 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. s 25(a) (emphasis added). 
19 R l' Felixs/oll'e JJ [1987] QB 582, ~91 Watkins LJ. 
:o Karl Du Fresne ··Defending the public's right to know" (3 May :200-i) The Press Christchurch. 
"
1 C Bay I is, "Justice Done and Justice seen to be Done-the Pub I ic Administration of Justice" ( 1991) 21 
VUWLR 177, 192. 
:: (:23 June 200-i) 618 NZPD 13891. 
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responsibility to hold the accu ed person to account to the State for conviction and 
punishment, but consequently are entitled to hold the Court. as a state agent, to 
ensure that that obligation is being met fairly and properly. 
The justice system belongs to the public and they have an interest in seeing offenders 
bought to justice, which is manifested through uninhibited access to the courts.23 
However, the granting of name suppression should not be heralded as the end 
of an accountable justice system.24 This is because publication of an accused's name 
is only one facet of carrying out the courts business in public.25 ame suppression 
prohibits publication of a person's name; the public and media may still visit the 
courtroom and see the person whose identity is suppressed. In this sense, the power of 
suppression 1s illusionary, as the public still retain uninhibited access to the 
courtroom.26 
otwithstanding that. the principle of open justice does not demand that 
publication of name occurs because a report can ·'fully inform the public of the course 
and result of the court proceedings without disclosing the accused's name.'"27 After 
all, the public will still know that someone has been charged, found guilty or 
acquitted of an offence. without necessarily needing to know that person·s identity. 
In cases involving suppression. the media will generally still be able to discuss the 
issues of the trial comprehensively and hence hold the justice system accountable. 
However. the Court of Appeal has rejected this approach, arguing that full 
transparency is necessary to completely comply with the principle of open justice.28 It 
23 
Katrina Jones The Suppression Discretion: Name Suppression Lmr in Nell' Zealand (LLB(Hons) Legal 
Writing Requirement, Victoria Universit) or Wellington , 1995) 6. 
2
-1 Roderick Munday '·Name Suppression: an adjunct to the presumption of innocence and to mitigation of 
sentence-2" ( 1991) Crim LR 753, 757. 
25 
0 'Malley r Police ( 12 February 1993) HC CI-ICH AP -W/93. 2 Williamson J. 
26 
An exception to this would be if the Judge ordered the court to be cleared under section I 38(2)(c) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
27 
Burrows and Wilson. abO\e n 13. 18. 
28 
Hence the prima facie presumption is in favour of publication of the name ofa defendant in order to 
comply with the principle of open justice: R 1· Liddell [ I 995] I NZLR 538, 546 - 547 (CA) Cooke P for the 
Court. 
9 
is difficult to identity situations where it is essential to know the defendant's name in 
order to hold the justice system accountable. For example, it may be harder to assess 
whether those with a high public profile receive special treatment before the courts if 
their names are suppressed. In such a case, the media cannot immediately identify 
whether equality before the law is being applied. But, even in this situation the media 
can usually describe the figure to a certain degree, by referring to them as a ''sports 
player" or "television celebrity", for example. This indicates their status to the public 
and allows the media to assess whether those with a high public profile receive 
preferential treatment.
29 
If the suppression order is eventually lifted, then the media 
can assess favourability. So, there is a strong argument that in most cases name 
suppression will not dramatically impede the public's right to open justice. 
The Courts have recognised that while the principle is impottant, it is not 
unqualified. The principle "cannot be framed in absolute terms. Its content is neither 
inflexible nor immutable:·30 Sometimes the principle must give way to other 
considerations, such as the right to a fair trial. 
B Freedom of Expression 
The openness principle is coupled with the right to freedom of expression, as 
recognised in section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act .31 Not only is there a right to 
publish information about criminal proceedings. but the public has a right to receive 
information about such a fundamental process in society. 32 HO\vever, this freedom is 
not absolute, as the Bill of Rights indicates.33 The Court of Appeal in Lewis v Wilson 
& Horton Ltd (Le111is) stated that it will be necessary for the Judge to consider 
29 
For example. in a case where a rugby player pleaded guilt) to assaulting his wife, the player was named 
as an All Black. The fact that he was named as an All Black ensured people were able to discuss issues of 
equality before the law effecti,ely; his name being published was not essential to that debate: Section VII. 
30 Police v O'Connor [ I 992] I NZLR 87. 96 (HC) Thomas J. 
31 
ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
32 
Section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states that '·Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek , receive. and impart information and opinions of any kind in any 
form" (emphasis added). 
33 
Section 5 of the New Zealand Bi II of Rights Act 1990 states that the rights and freedoms contained in it 
may be subject only to .. such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.·· 
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whether in the circumstances an order prohibiting publication 1s a reasonable 
limitation on the right to receive and impart information freely, such as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.34 Unfortunately, in practice. 
judges seem interested in drawing attention to the impo11ance of open justice. but pay 
little attention to considering whether limits on free expression are truly justified.35 
C Right to a Fair Trial 
Before conviction. other liberties apply, such as the right to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent court. 36 Steps must be taken to ensure that publicity will 
not prejudice a defendant's trial, as a fair trial is not only an individual's fundamental 
right, but is central to a free and democratic society. It has been held that no right is 
more inviolate than the right to a fair trial and to compel an individual to face an 
unfair trial is repugnant to justice.37 The courts will grant suppression to ensure a fair 
trial :38 
Once ... it has been determined that there is a significant risk that the accused will not 
receive a fair trial , the issue ceases to be one of balancing. The principles of freedom 
of expression must be departed from, not balanced against. There is no room in a 
civilised society to conclude that, 'on balance ', an accused shou ld be compelled to 
face an unfair trial. 
An example of a situation v\here suppression might be needed would be if a 
defendant was facing charges for two similar offences. Suppression might be granted 
so that jury members are not prejudiced against the defendant, because of their 
knowledge that the defendant is facing further analogous charges. 39 Suppression may 
34
Lewis 1· Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 8, para 43 Elias CJ for the Court. 
35 See section VIII. 
36 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(a). 
37 
B 1· R ( I September 2000) CA308/00, para I O Thomas J for the Cou11. 
38 
R v Burns (Travis) [2002] I ZLR 387, 404-405 (CA) Thomas J. 
39 
This was the situation in The Queen v Rokas Karpa1·ici11s, Dm·id John Blaikie. Michael Edward Pearson, 
and Cran/ A11thon_1· Martin O October 2000) I IC AK TOOO I 037 Chambers J. 
II 
also be necessary in cases where identity is at issue in criminal cases. In such cases 
name suppression may only be granted until the completion of the trial. 
There is also the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according 
to law.
40 
Reconciling this right with the principle of open justice causes difficulty for 
judges, who are confronted with name suppression applications prior to conviction.41 
III THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
A Automatic Suppression 
There is an automatic prohibition on the publication of certain names and any 
particulars likely to lead to their identification. In these situations, Parliament has 
made a policy decision that the principles of open justice and free expression must 
give way to other interests, particularly the need for privacy. There is little 
controversy about the appropriateness of the following provisions. 
Victims and alleged victims of sexual offences4~ automatically have their 
names suppressed under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act (the Act).43 There is a 
prohibition on the publication of a person's name accused or convicted of incest.44 
Also suppressed are those accused or convicted of sexually assaulting a dependent 
family member, for example a foster parent who abuses a child in their care.45 
40 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(c). 
4 1 
See section V. 
-1'.! These are defined as offences against the Crimes Act 1961, sections I 28-l-t2A or an offence against 
section 144A. These include sexual violation, indecency with under-age girls, and criminal sexual acts 
against males. 
4
' Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139. The onl) exception to this prohibition is if the Coun permits 
publication. To do this, the victim must be O\ er the age of 16 years: s 139( I). 
44 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139(2). 
45 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139(2). This section prohibits identification of those v.ho have committed an 
offence against section 13 I of the Crimes Act 1961. Section 131 makes sexual connection, attempted 
sexual connection and indecent acts with dependent family member ' s criminal offences. Dependant family 
member is defined in the Crimes Act 1961. s 131 A. 
These provisions are supplemented by section 375A(4) of the Crimes Act 1961 which restricts those who 
may be present when a complainant gives evidence and allows a judge to prohibit publication of the details 
of the criminal acts alleged. 
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The purpose of these provisions is to protect the victim's identity.46 Hence, in 
cases such as incest, the identity of the defendant needs to be protected so that the 
victim also remains anonymous. Consequently, if a victim of a sexual offence no 
longer wishes to remain anonymous he or she can apply to the Court for an order 
permitting publication of his or her name47 or the name of the perpetrator of the 
offence, in cases of incest or abuse by a caregiver.48 
A witness in a criminal proceeding who is under the age of 17 also receives 
automatic name suppression.49 Any person who acts in contravention of these 
suppression orders can be liable for a fine not exceeding I ,OOO dollars. 50 
Automatic suppression orders for offenders convicted of sexual crimes form 
the majority of all suppression orders given to convicted persons. In 2004, 128 
offenders received name suppression for sexual crimes. out of a total of 483 orders 
issued.
51 
This equates to 26 per cent. In 2004, 20 per cent of violent sexual offenders 
and 16.4 percent of ··other sexual offenders'· received name suppression.52 
46 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139( I AA). 
47 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139(1A). 
48 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 , s l 39(2A). In both cases, applicants must be over 16 and the Court must be 
satisfied that they understand the nature and effect of their decision to apply for such an order: Criminal 
Justice Act 1985, ss 139( I A), I 39(2A). The new provisions do not make it clear whether the victim ·s 
application must be made during the course of the original proceedings or whether it can be made after their 
conclusion, perhaps even years later, as often occurs in cases of sexual abuse. Adopting a purposive 
approach the new provisions should cover the latter situation, otherwise the) would be of I imited efficacy: 
See Chan v Allomey General [2005] NZAR 135 (HC) MacKenzie J. 
49 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 , s l 39A( I). The only other person whose name is automatically suppressed is 
a person in respect of whom an application has been made for an order to authorise the taking ofa blood or 
DNA sample: Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995. s 14. The Judge may consent to 
pub I ication if the person has been charged with the relevant offence: Criminal Investigations (Blood 
Samples) Act 1995, s 19. 
5° Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139(3). Contravention of a suppression order under s I 39A( I) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 (publishing the name ofa witness under 17) will result in a tine of I.OOO dollars 
for an individual or 5,000 dollars in the case ofa body corporate: Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139A(3). 
5 1 
1inistry of Justice "'Name Suppression Order "(September 2005) Table I (Obtained under Official 
Information Act 1982 Request to the Crime and Criminal Justice Team. Ministry of Justice). Please see the 
appendix on page 83. Table I refers to the number of offenders who were convicted of offences who 
received interim or permanent name suppression. 
52 
Ministry of Justice, above n 51, Table 2. ··Other sexual offences" include incest and doing an indecent 
act. Table 2 refers to the percentage number of offenders who were convicted of offences who received 
permanent or interim name suppression. The statistic refer solely to convicted offenders and do not 
involve suppression orders gi,en to victims, 1,,itnesses or others connected" ith proceedings. 
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B Discretionary Suppression 
The courts also hold discretionary powers of suppression. The Act creates a 
presumption that criminal proceedings will be conducted in public, but provides 
various exceptions to this rule. 53 Section 140 is one such provision and is widely 
stated:54 
[A] court may make an order prohibiting the publication, in any report or account 
relating to proceedings in respect of an offence, of the name, address, or occupation 
of the person accused or convicted of the offence, or of any other person connected 
with the proceedings, or any particulars likely to lead to any such person·s 
identification. 
Thus, the court can suppress the name of the defendant, victim, witnesses or others 
connected with proceedings. 55 Any order can be made for a limited period, known as 
an ''interim suppression order .. , or can have permanent effect.56 The circumstances 
surrounding name suppression applications are varied and consequently Parliament 
has thought it wise not to lay down rules to regulate the courts discretion.57 One 
constraint is that the views of the victim of the offence must be considered, but only 
in applications for permanent name suppression.58 The Land Transport Act provides 
that the name of a person convicted of driving under the influence will generally not 
53 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 138(1 ). For example, if the court is of the opinion that "the interests of 
justice, or of public morality or of the reputation of any victim of any sexual offence require" it may make 
orders forbidding pub! ication of evidence, submissions and witnesses names: Criminal Justice Act I 985, s 
I 38(2)(a), (i), (ii). 
5"Criminal Justice Act 1985 , s 140(1). 
55 
In the case of witnesses the order is more likely to be made under sect ion 138(2) of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1985 , which specifically authorises the suppress ion of witnesses· names. Both sections 138(2) and 140 
only apply to criminal proceedings; the power to suppress names in Ci\ ii proceedings derives from the 
court's inherent jurisdiction: Angus,. H & Anor (June 17 1999) HC WN CP 129-99 Wild CJ. 
56 
Criminal Justice Act I 985, s 140(2). A right of appeal lies against orders made. For example, if a District 
Court Judge refuses to suppress name, an interim order will be made for suppression pending an appeal: 
Summary Proceedings Act 1957, s I I 5C. There is a s imilar right of appeal from the High Court to the 
Court of Appea l. The order will terminate when the time for appeal expires. ifno appea l has been lodged: 
Criminal Justice Act 1985. section 140(3). However, there is no right of appeal against an o rd er lifting 
suppression during the course of a trial: Re Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220, 234 (CA) Keith J for the Court. 
57 R v Liddell, above n 28, 546 Cooke P for the Cou,'t. 
58 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 , s 140(4A). If the\ ictim is not of sufficient maturity to express their views a 
parent or guardian will be consulted. 
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receive suppression.59 The courts are obviously adhering to this because since 1998, 
less than 0.1 per cent of convicted offenders received name suppression.60 Other than 
these considerations, the section is silent on the circumstances in which the discretion 
should be exercised. 
This unfettered discretion found in section 140 has created controversy. The 
cou1ts have declined to lay down any fettering code for exercising their discretion, 
which fuels allegations of inconsistency. 6 1 The Law Commission says: '·Jt is clear 
that some people believe that suppression orders are being made too frequently, in 
part due to the wide discretion vested in judges.''62 Scott Optican, a legal 
commentator, believes the wide discretion vested in judges leads to inconsistent 
decisions.
63 
But, some discretion is necessary because of the importance of factual 
considerations in name suppression decisions, which judges need to be able to 
balance with a degree of flexibility. New Zealand judges recognise that their 
discretion can bring them criticism: '·name suppression cases are never easy and it is 
often a situation where different minds may take different views.''6-1 Hence, discretion 
is a double-edged sword; it avoids rigidity for judges, but means that their decisions 
may be seen as incorrect. Another judge (or a member of the public) may come to the 
opposite conclusion on the facts, because of different value judgments. 
59 Land Transport Act 1998, s 66. 
60 
Ministry of Justice. above n 51 , Tables I and 2. Table I sliows that between 1998-2004 there were a 
smal I number of cases that received name suppression, but Table 2 refers to the percentage number as zero. 
This seems to be because when the individual ea es are computed as a percentage of the whole the number 
is close to zero percent. 
61 R v Liddell, above n 28, 54 7 Cooke P for the Court. 
6
~ New Zealand Law Commission De/ii•ering Justice .for All: A Vision .for Ne ,1 · Zealand Courts and 
Tribunals (NZLC R85 , Wellington, 2004) 3 I 3. 
63 
' ·Name suppression too easily granted-law e 'pert ' ', above n 9. Similar sentiments have been expressed by 
Warren Young. acting President of the Law Commission in "Legal ad\ isers fm our secrecy", above n 9, A2. 
64 
C v Police ( 17 July 1990) HC CHCH AP 166/90, 4 Tipping J. 
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IV OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE-SUPPRESSION THE EXCEPTION AND 
NOT THE RULE 
A number of principles have been developed in relation to exerc1s1ng the 
court's discretion, despite the absence of a strict code.65 The Court of Appeal says: 
"The starting point must always be the importance in a democracy of freedom of 
speech, open judicial proceedings, and the right of the media to report the latter fairly 
and accurately as surrogates of the public."66 The Court has said ·'[T] he balance must 
come down clearly in favour of suppression if the prima facie presumption in favour 
of open reporting is to be overcome."67 The defendant must demonstrate ·'compelling 
reasons'' or "very special circumstances·' to justify suppressing their name.68 
Leaving aside considerations of free expression and open justice, there are 
other reasons for exercising the discretion sparingly. These include the possibility of 
suspicion falling on other innocent members of the community,69 the chance of 
further victims coming forward following publicity and the prospect that publicity 
might lead to the discovery of additional evidence.70 An absence of publicity might 
provide the accused with an opportunity to re-offend 71 and there is also a need to give 
the public the ability to choose whether to continue contact with the alleged 
offender.72 However, some of these justifications only pertain to ce11ain cases. For 
example, in cases of sexual offending there may be a real need to publicise the 
defendant's name so that other victims may seek assistance.73 However, in the case of 
a first time offender charged with a minor offence these considerations are not so 
compelling. The courts seem to recognise this difference too, as where these 
65 Criminal Justice Act 1985 , s 140. 
66 R \' Liddell, above 11 28, 546 Cooke P for the Court. 
67 Lell' is 1· Wilson & Horton Ltd, above 118,559 Elias CJ Judgment of the Court. 
68 Re Victim X, above n 56, 239 Keith J for the Court. 
69 Police v M (5 March 2002) HC CHCH A9/02, para 37 Panckhurst and Chisholm JJ. 
70 R v Liddell, above n 28, 545 Cooke P for the Court. 
71 Prockter ,, R { 1997] I NZLR 295, 300 (CA) Thoma J for the Court 
7
:. Prock/er,, R, above n 71, 300 Thoma~ J for the Court. 
73 
R 1· Liddell , above 11 28, 545 Cooke P for the Court. However, in another sexual abuse case there was 
little risk of other complainant coming forward and a real chance of prejudicing the defendant's trial by 
publication so suppression was ordered by the Court of Appeal: P 1· R (2 August 1996) CA 260/96 Thomas 
J for the Court. 
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justifications are largely absent trends indicate that the courts are more likely to grant 
. . . 7.J 
111tenm suppression. 
A further reason for granting permanent name suppression infrequently is 
because it allows the true character of the offender to remain concealed from society. 
Name suppression practices a deception on the public, by continuing to present the 
offender as a person of unblemished character. 75 This argument is particularly 
important in cases of serious offending. 
The Court of Appeal has indicated that victims and witnesses must also 
demonstrate compelling reasons to justify suppression of their names.76 The 
desirability of imposing the same high threshold on innocent parties is questionable, 
especially since many of the justifications mentioned here do not apply to them. This 
issue is discussed in section XIII. 
V INTERIM SUPPRESSION 
A defendant can seek name suppression at different stages in a criminal 
proceeding and for varying durations. Interim orders can be made until depositions, 
until trial or until conviction. 77 Commentators argue that interim orders are not 
infrequently made until the defendant enters a plea, or less frequently until the 
conclusion of a trial. 78 Unfortunately, there are no statistics which show the number 
74 
For example the absence of suspicion falling on others and the lack of additional evidence coming 
forward was seen as highly relevant in Serious Fraud Office v Band K [ 1999] OCR 621,624 Judge 
Hubble. See section V for a discussion of thi s issue. 
75 
Roberts v Police ( 1989) 4 CRNZ 429, 432 (HC) Wylie J. 
76 Re Victim X, above n 56, 226 Keith J for the Court. 
77 
Criminal Justice Act, ss 140(2), 140(3). Such limited o rders may be rep laced by further limited orders 
under section 140( 4). 
78 
Hon Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (loose leaf, Brookers, Wellington, Criminal Justice 
Act 1985) para 140.08 (last updated September 2005). Similarly. Hall argues that ·'it is not unus ual for an 
interim order for uppre sion to be granted only until the deposit ions hearing or shortly thereafter": 
Geoffrey Hall ( ed) Hall 's Sentencing (loose leaf, Butterworths, Wei I in gton, Cri minal Justice Act 1985) 
para CJ A 140.1 a (last updated July 2005). 
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of interim orders granted.79 The considerations that apply to interim and permanent 
orders can differ, but the overriding principle of open justice remains the same.so 
A Initial Orders 
Initially, an accused may seek an interim order so that family and friends can 
be informed of proceedings.s 1 Such interim orders may only apply for a week or so, 
and in most circumstances the police would not usually oppose such an application.s2 
Freedom of expression and open justice give way to the privacy interests of the 
accused and their family. 
However, even such orders. are not automatic. For example, a Mangaere man 
was recently accused of intending to cause grievous bodily harm, after he attacked a 
truck driver with a hammer. He sought interim suppression.s3 Judge Harvey said the 
amount of publicity about the case and graphic images featured in the media via 
security camera meant he would not be prepared to grant interim suppression.84 
79 
Victoria Crawford, Policy Manager of the Crime and Criminal Justice Team at the linistry of Justice, to 
the author ··Official Information Act 1982 Request Reply"' ( 16 September 2005) Letter. 
80 Prockter ,, R, above n 71, 298 Thomas J for the Court. 
81 Collie v Police ( 14 June 1993) HC AK AP I 03/93 Henry J. 
3
:> Grant Huscroft and Scott Optican '·Arguments for and against Name Suppression" (January 19 2000) 
The New Zealand Herald Auckland A 12. 
83 
Jarrod Booker ··Hammer accused gets bail, name suppression" (26 August 2005) The Nell' Zealand 
Herald Auckland General news. Interim name suppression was sought because the defendant's father had 
only just been released from hospital with a serious heart problem and did not know his son had been 
charged. The man also alleged he had a close relative taking pa11 in a spo11ing activity soon after the 
charges were announced, who could --do without the publicity." An embarrassing situation could have 
resulted for the Court if the man had been given name suppression. gi\en the fact that his claims to be 
related to a famous sports star appear to ha\ e been fabricated. Sione Lauaki, a current All Black recently 
denied being related to the man. Toma Lauaki: Deborah Diaz --sports pair den1 hammer attack link·· (30 
August 2005) The Dominion Post Wei lington I. 
3
-1 Jarrod Booker, above n 83, I. Corroborated by Rebecca Palmer "Hammer attack: name a secret" (26 
August 2005) The Dominion Post Wellington I. It is concerning that headlines about this story give the 
impression that the man was granted interim suppression. The man was actually denied suppression, his 
name remained suppressed so that he could appeal the decision. The casual reader could pick up the wrong 
impression of the case and become misinformed. 
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B Interim Suppression until Charges Dealt With 
The accused may then seek interim suppress ion until the trial commences, or 
is completed. It is often difficult to assess the principles which apply to such interim 
applications, as many of the seminal judgments from the Court of Appeal concern 
requests for permanent name suppression. However, many of the same considerations 
are applicable. One Court of Appeal case concerning interim name suppression, 
Prockter v R (Prockter). makes it clear that the principles of freedom of reporting and 
open justice remain the starting point both before and after conviction. 85 
In the same manner as they do for permanent orders, the Court will examine 
the consequences of publication on the defendant, their family, work colleagues and 
the effects on financial and professional interests. Some damage out of the ordinary is 
required, as there are often negative and distressing personal consequences associated 
with any criminal proceeding.86 An important consideration exists for interim orders, 
which does not apply to applications for permanent suppression. This is the 
presumption of innocence. A recent decision of Panckhurst J rightly recognises this 
distinction: 87 
Not only do the fo rm er [interim orders] have to be considered in light of the 
ci rcumstance that guil t is st ill to be determined , but also with due recognition of the 
fact that the question is often one of timing. The principle of open j ustice is of lesser 
s ignifi cance where an interim order is made in recognition of the fact that at least 
until guilt is determined there are legitimate private interests which warrant 
protection in the meantime. 
85 
Prock/er 1• R, above n 71, 298 Thomas J for the Co urt. 
86 
Le1ris v Wilson & Horton Ltd. above n 8,563 Elias CJ fo r the Court . 
87 
T v Police (7 June 2005) HC CHCH CR l-2005-409-000098, para 24. Arguably Panckhurst J makes the 
presumption of innocence the starting point. contrary to the direction b) the Cou rt of Ap peal to have open 
justice as the sta rtin g point. This is discussed at page 23. 
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Prior to conviction, the presumption of innocence must be recognised, in accordance 
with the Bill of Rights Act. 88 However, the weight to be accorded to this presumption 
is causing considerable difficulty in the courts, leading to inconsistent decisions. 
J Court of Appeal 's Approach 
In Prock/er the Court was considering an application for interim name 
suppression, for a surgeon facing 22 counts of sexual abuse.89 The hardship that 
would be caused to the surgeon and his family by publication was accepted as 
·'extreme."
90 
The surgeon also argued that publicity would destroy his professional 
practice.
91 
Indeed, even being accused of such a crime would be devastating for 
someone 111 the medical profession, as trust is the basis of the patient-doctor 
relationship. 
However. the Court said that interim suppression should not be granted to a 
professional person, solely because of their reputation. The Court held: '·one must be 
careful to avoid creating a special echelon of privileged persons in the community 
who will enjoy suppression where their less unfortunate compatriots would not.''92 
Consequently. potentially innocent people may have their careers destroyed. because 
of the need for open justice. It is noticeable that despite the Court of Appeal"s stance 
on this issue professional people are often granted interim name suppression until the 
outcome of proceedings are known.93 The reason for this seems to be because some 
courts recognise the irreparable effect on a professionars career that publicity of an 
accusation might have.94 
88 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. s 25(c). 
89 
The al legations related to six youths over an I 8 year period: R r Prockter, above n 71, 296 Thomas J for 
the Cou,t. 
90 
?rockier v R, above n 71, 299 Thomas J for the Court. 
91 
?rockier v R, above n 71 , 299 Thomas J for the Court. 
92 
?rockier v R, above n 71 , 299-300 Thomas J for the Court. 
93 
Director of Pmceedings ,. I [200-1] OCR 532, 551 (HC) Frater J. 
94 
Director of Proceedings, . I, above n 93 . 551 Frater J. 
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Of most interest was the Court of Appeal's finding in Prockter that the 
presumption of innocence is just one factor to be taken into account and given such 
weight as is appropriate in each case.95 The Court recognised that the presumption 
''becomes a significant factor to be weighed in the balance against the principles that 
favour open reporting. ''96 The Court emphasised that while the presumption is a factor 
to be weighed, it cannot of itself displace the presumption of open justice. This is 
reasonable; otherwise every person would gain suppression, because every defendant 
is entitled to the presumption. The issue from Prock/er is identifying the correct 
weight to be attributed to the presumption, in any given case. 
In Prock/er the presumption of innocence, coupled with some weighty 
personal factors. were insufficient to displace the presumption of publicity. The Couti 
seemed to feel that the possibility of further victims coming forward was a weighty 
.c: · • 97 ,actor against suppression. 
2 Jcisues with the Presumption of Innocence 
Arguably, the Cou1i's stance in Prock/er fails to give sufficient weight to the 
presumption of innocence.98 In the Prock/er judgment there is no recognition of 
whether the limits on this right are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. Earlier High Cou1i authority appeared to afford a greater weight to the 
presumption of innocence than the Court does in Prockter. 99 Fisher J notes the 
difficulty of fai I ing to recognise the presumption of innocence: 100 
Publication of name is frequently a major and appropriate element of an offender's 
punishment once it is established that he or she is guilty. But puniti,e considerations 
95 Prock/er, , R, above n 71, 298 Thomas J for the Court. 
96 Prock/er v R, above n 71, 298 Thomas J for the Court. 
97
However, suppre ion was granted because of the possibility that one of the complainants might be 
identified by publicity and the need to ensure that the defendant recei\ed a fair trial: Prock/er,. R, above n 
71 , 302 Thomas J for the Court. 
98 This is the opinion of the Law Commission, above n 62, 316. 
99 
See M v Police, above n 4, 15-16 Fisher J; S(/) and S(2) v Police ( I 995) 12 CRNZ 714 (HC) Neazor J. 
100 M v Police, above n 4, 15-16 Fisher J. 
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are obviously irrelevant before conviction. At that stage the defendant is entitled to 
the presumption of innocence . . . Consequently when a Court allows publicity which 
will have serious adverse consequences for an unconvicted defendant, it must do so 
in the knowledge that it is penalising a potentially innocent person ... That is far from 
saying that suppression should always be granted before guilt is established ... in my 
view the presumption of innocence and risk of substantial harm to an innocent 
person should be expressly articulated. 
It has been noted that publicity '"is one of the chief deterrents to evil doing; 
and one of the severest punishments that evil doers have to face.'·10 1 But, as Fisher J 
articulates such punitive considerations are irrelevant to an accused. Similarly, one 
must also remember that the stigma associated \Vith being charged with a serious 
offence may not be easily erased following an acquittal; the feeling that there is often 
"no smoke without fire.'' Nigel Walker explains: 102 
[To] assume that an acquittal leaves a person·s reputation exactl y as it was before 
trial. .. is unlikely to be true if the media have paid an) attention to the case-some 
people will assume that he got off because of slightly defective evidence, a clever 
story or a sympathetic jury: and since guilty men are sometimes acquitted for these 
reasons it is impossible to combat this cynical assumption. It is a little paradoxical 
that a system of trial designed to give the accused the benefit of the doubt in court is 
almost bound to ensure the public does the opposite. 
Therefore, reconciling the presumption of open justice with the presumption of 
innocence is controversial. 103 It is hard to justify harm to a person, who is entitled to 
the presumption of innocence, as a necessary consequence of openness and free 
speech. 
101 Jones, above n 23 , 11. 
102 
Heleen Scheer '·Case and Comment" ( 1993) 53 CLJ 37, 39. 
103 Burrows and Cheer, above n 15 , 338. 
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3 Case Law 
The lower courts are having difficulty with this issue. The problem is 
identifying "the appropriate weight to be given to the presumption, in the 
circumstances of the case." 104 The innocence presumption has been seen as material 
in tipping the scales towards suppression in a number of lower courts interim 
decisions, indicating that it is being treated as a significant factor. 105 
For example, Baragwanath J held that it might not be difficult to dislodge the 
publicity presumption at the initial appearance of an accused where a remand is 
granted, because of the need to recognise a person·s right to be presumed innocent. 106 
The Judge was also obviously concerned about damaging the defendant's standing in 
the community: "while freedom of expression is precious, so too is a well earned 
· ,, 107 reputation. 
Similarly. in T v Police a man was charged with having two underage girls 
\Vorking at his unlicensed brothel. 108 Panckhurst J was content to order name 
suppression until evidence was placed before the Court, because he was concerned 
about protecting the man·s reputation and business interests. 109 The Judge elevated 
the presumption of innocence to being the starting point in the case. 11 0 This is 
contrary to the Court of Appeal's direction that the principles of open justice and free 
io-1 Prock/er \' R, above 11 71, 298 Thomas J for the Court. 
105 See J v Serious Frnud Office (2 Oct 200 I) I-IC AK A 126-0 I Baragwa11ath J; Wellington Newspapers v 
XI [2000] DCR 16 I Judge Deobhakta; Serious Fraud CJff7ce v B & K, above n 74, Judge Hubble. 
Amazingly, even where an accused's identity has already been published b) the media, interim suppression 
has been granted, because of the need to recognise the presumption of innocence: See Adams on Criminal 
Law, above n 78, para I 0.6.08. 
106 Once evidence was commenced Baragwanath J conceded it would be exceptional for suppression to 
continue: J \' Serious Fraud (){(ice, above n I 05 , paras 26-36 Baragwanath J. 
107 J v Serious Fraud ()ff7ce. above n I 05. para 3 I Baragwanath J. 
108 The man was facing nine charges. These included operating an unlicensed brothel, receiving sexual 
services from a 14 year old, facilitating the provision of sexual sen ice from underage girls, recei\ ing 
money derived from such sexual services, supplying cannabis and being in possession of cannabis: T v 
Police, above 11 87, para 2 Panckhurst J. 
109 Tv Po/lee, above n 87, para 26 Panckhurst J. 
110 This is illustrated by the quote given on page 19: T v Police, above n 87. para 24. 
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expression should be the starting point. 111 Panckhurst J's decision was in opposition 
to a District Court ruling in the same case, where it was held that the public had the 
right to know the identity of a man charged with such a .. grave social evil." 112 This 
demonstrates the variability of the amount of weight judges accord the presumption 
of innocence. 
In Serious Fraud Office v Band K the defendants were charged with fraud. 113 
The Judge noted that personal and family factors are seldom sufficient to justify 
suppression and were absent in this case. 11 -1 Judge Hubble believed of greater 
importance was whether publicity would fall on other members of the community, the 
likelihood of further witnesses or evidence coming forward (which is linked to the 
nature of the charges) and whether the failure to publish would present the defendants 
with an opportunity to re-offend. 11 5 These factors were not present. Because the facts 
relied upon to support the charges were not well known, Judge Hubble said 
·'considerable weight should be given to the presumption of innocence."' 16 
In a similar vein, Judge Deobkhata gave interim suppression to a number of 
wine makers who were facing prosecution by the Ministry of Health. 117 Again, the 
Judge was persuaded that other complaints were unlikely to surface upon publication 
of the defendant's names. In this case, publication could cause irreparable damage to 
the defendant"s reputations and might cause hardship to staff and third parties. 118 
These are considerations which generally attach to criminal proceedings. In Prockter, 
the devastating effects on the surgeon's reputation and family life were insufficient to 
justify suppression. 119 However, in this case these reasons were sufficient; the 
presumption of innocence was given full weight. 
111 
Prockter v R, above n 71, 298 Thomas J for the Cou11. 
11 " T 1· Police, above n 87, para 6 Panckhurst J. 
113 
Serious Fraud Office v Band K, above n 7-l, 622 Judge Hubble. 
114 
Serious Fraud 0.ff7ce 1• Band K, above n 74, 624 Judge Hubble. This is consistent with the position 
adopted in Prock/er v R, above n 71, 299 Thomas J for the Court. 
115 
Serious Fraud O.ffice v Band K, above n 74, 624 Judge Hubble. 
116 
Serious Fraud Office v Band K, above n 74, 624 Judge Hubble. 
117 
Wellington Newspapers Ltd v XL and others, above n I 05, 161 Judge Deobhakta. 
118 
We/1/ngton Neivspapers Ltd v XL and others, above n I 05, 161 Judge Deobhakta. 
119 
Prock/er v R, above n 71, 299 Thomas J for the Court. 
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In contrast, other judge's give lesser weight to the presumption, even 1n 
compelling circumstances. In Warburton v New Zealand Police, a solicitor sought 
interim name suppression, while he awaited a depositions hearing on fraud charges. 120 
Depositions were said to be at least six months away. It was contended that 
publication of the man ' s name would adversely affect his legal practice, erode his 
professional income, thus curtailing his ability to fund his own legal defence at trial 
and pay his employees. 121 No special weight was accorded to the presumption of 
innocence, it was merely a factor to be put in the mix and balanced. 122 
The Judge was not concerned about damage to the solicitor's professional 
future, contrary to the other decisions discussed. Little weight was given to the effect 
on innocent third parties, the solicitor's employees. Also, there was no attention given 
to whether additional victims or evidence would result from publication, which seems 
unlikely in this case. The Judge did not order suppression. 
In the case of Campbell v Police, a District Councillor seeking re-election 
sought interim name suppression. 123 He was charged with possession of child 
pornography and pleaded not guilty. The Judge stated that the presumption of 
innocence cannot be elevated above other factors , which is consisted with Prockter. 124 
The Judge conceded that '·publication would probably spell the end of Mr Campbell's 
life in public office, at least in the near future." 125 So in this case we have irreparable 
harm, but this is still insufficient to justify suppression. The Judge indicated that some 
irreparable harm to a third party would be necessary before the cou11 would 
intervene. 126 This is a unique approach. given that the Court of Appeal has said that 
when the harm to the defendant outweighs the crime committed and the public 
interest in disclosure intervention is warranted. 127 The presumption of innocence was 
1
"
0 
Warburton v NeH' Zealand Police ( 19 August 2004) HC HAM CRl-2004-419-85. para 7 Priestley J. 
1
"
1 Warburton r Nell' Zealand Police. above n 120. para 17 Priestle) J. 
1
"" Warburton v Ne1r Zealand Police, above n 120. para 36 Priestley J. 
1
"
3 Campbell v Police (2004) 21 CRNZ 51 (HC) Harrison J. 
1
"
4 Campbell v Police, above n 123, para 1-i Harrison J. 
1
"
5 Campbell, , Police. above n 123, para 12 Harrison J. 
126 Campbell v Police, above n 123, para 13 Harrison J. 
127 R v Liddell, above n 28. 5-+7 Cooke P for the Court. 
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unable to tip the scales. In contrast, in Christchurch the presumption was sufficient to 
give a councillor seeking election, name suppression for the grave charge of 
threatening to ki II. 128 
There is also variance 1n the way judges treat police officers. ln R v Police 
suppression was granted to a police officer facing charges of grievous bodily harm 
and assault. 129 The Court based their decision on the presumption of innocence and 
the need to prevent attacks upon the police officer and his family. Suppression was 
given until the outcome of the trial was known. 130 
This decision is inconsistent with the decision 111 Abbolt v Wallace, where 
Constable Abbott was prosecuted for shooting and killing Mr Wallace. 131 The 
circumstances for suppression were compelling. Affidavits were presented to the 
Court demonstrating the trauma felt by officers who are forced to shoot people and 
the effect on their families. As in R v Police the officer's family had been 
threatened. 132 However these issues. coupled with the presumption of innocence and 
the risk to the officer's career were insufficient to justify suppression. 133 The 
circumstances justifying suppression were as convincing as in R v Police, considering 
that in this case the Constable was acting as a public officer performing a public 
duty.13..i 
128 
John Henzel I .. Local body politician committed for trial" (21 December 200-+) The Press Christchurch 
Local News. 
129 
R v Police ( 19 November 2002) HC WN AP 256/02 Wi Id J. The text of this case is restricted to lav. yers. 
due to suppression orders. This raises issues of access to justice. For the purposes of this paper statements 
about the case are taken from the Lexis case summary available online: 
<http ://helicon.vuw.ac.nz:2467/nz/legaJ/search/homesubmitForm.do> (last accessed I October 2005). 
130 R r Police, above n 129, Wild J. 
13 1 Abbot/,, Wallace [2002] NZAR 95 (HC) Salmon and Potter JJ. 
132 Abboll v Wallace. above n 13 I, paras 9-1 0 Salmon and Potter JJ. 
133 Abbott 1· Wallace. above n 131. paras 35-39 Salmon and Potter JJ. 
n.i A Private Members Bill was introduced into Parliament, but later abandoned. which gaYe police officers 
automatic name suppression in firearm cases. The Attorne) General considered that the I imitation on the 
right to freedom of expression was demonstrabl) justified, because of the need to protect the integrity of the 
Police Complaint's Authority's investigations, which may be hindered b) media interest. Arguably, media 
interest may assist the Authority as those with information about the officer being investigated may come 
forward following publicity. Also, if Authority investigations are truly hindered by publicity (and there is 
no concrete evidence they are) , questions arise as why suppression is not proposed for al l officer 
investigated for all conduct. A further objective of the Bill was to protect the safety of police officers and 
their families. But, suppressing the name of the officer will be no use in small communities where the 
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The variance in sexual offending cases also warrants discussion. In Prockter it 
was held that publication is a "most important factor" in such cases, because of the 
possibility of further victim's coming forward. 135 Consistent with Prockter is A 
Defendant v Police. 136 A District Court Judge was charged with 21 charges of sexual 
offending, in respect of three complainants who were members of his wider family. 137 
He unsuccessfully applied for suppression. The Court held that the presumption of 
innocence must weigh with any Court, but does not override the publicity 
presumption by itself. The Court was quick to recognise the need for open justice and 
seemed to give the presumption of innocence little weight: ··ft would seem that there 
would be a presumption of favouring the publication of the particulars of a judicial 
officer charged with an offence unless the reasons for suppression spoke loud and 
clear in a manner that would be accepted in any case relating to any other member of 
the public who was facing a charge.'' 138 
However, in other cases. those charged with sexual assault have received 
interim suppression, with the courts giving great \\eight to the presumption of 
innocence. In Iv Police a 70 year old man \Vas charged with five counts of indecent 
assault, against three victims. 139 In direct contrast to Prockter. the court granted name 
suppression. because of the adverse effect publication v,1ould have on the man's 
children. 140 The defendant had had a long association with children in his work and 
social environment and the possibility of further victims coming forward could not be 
excluded. 14 1 In K v Police the complainant desired publication of her stepfather·s 
identity of the officer will be hot gossip. A full analysis of this proposed reform is beyond the scope of this 
paper: See Attorney General "Police Complaints Authority (Conditional Name Protection) Amendment 
Bill: Con istency With The New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990." (5 March 2003) 
http: //www.j ustice.govt .nz/bi I I-of-rights/bi 11-1 ist-2003/p-bi 11 /pol ice-complaints .html (last acces ed 2 
October 2005). 
ns Procter,. R, above n 71 . 300 Thomas J for the Court. Similar sentiments \\ere expressed in R r Liddell. 
above n 28, 545 Cooke P for the Court. Pub I ication is seen as more appropriately done before the trial. 
rather than after, becau e of the problems associated with admitting similar fact evidence. 
"
0 A Defendant v Police ( I 997) 14 CRNZ 579, 584 (HC) Doogue J 
"
7 A Defendant v Police, above n 136,580 Doogue J. 
138 A Defendant 1• Police. above n 136, 588 Doogue J. 
1
'
9 I,. Nell' Zealand Police (8 April 2003) HC WN AP40 03 . para 2 France J. 
140 Iv NeH' Zealand Police , above n 139. para 37 France J. Other facto rs were present but this one seemed 
to weigh most hea\ ily with the Judge. 
141 Iv Nell' Zealand Police, above n 139. para 2 1 France J. 
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h 2- , d 141 name, w o she alleged had raped her over a ) year peno . - Because of the 
uncertainty of the historical evidence, the Judge felt that ''the presumption of 
innocence and the protection of this man from a false allegation cannot be so 
confidently discounted that the public's right to know must be given immediate 
d , ,,143 pre om1nance. 
in D v Police suppression was given to a convicted sex offender facing fwther 
charges of sexual assault. 144 Frater J was content to order interim suppression, based 
on the presumption of innocence and taking into account society's interest in the 
man's rehabilitation. 145 However, there was little threat of further victims commg 
forward , which seems to have weighed heavily in the Judge's thinking 
Giving the presumption extraordinary weight, Judge Tuohy argues that 
merely being charged with certain offences may cause sufficient harm to warrant 
, 1-16 name suppression: 
Sometimes, particularly in relation to offences where a degree of odium attaches in 
the public mind simply because of people being charged, suppression is granted 
simply in the s ituation where there is a presumption of innocence before trial. 
Cases of sexual assault are certainly those that attract ·'a degree of odium:· Judge 
Tuohy' s comments effectively elevate the presumption of innocence above other 
factors. This approach is problematic. because other judges do not accord the 
presumption such prominence. 
There is little guidance available as to the weight to be attributed to the 
presumption and the circumstances when it should tip the scales. 147 Warren Young. of 
the Law Commission, argues that there is enormous inconsistency between different 
i-1J Kv New Zealand Police (3 February 1997) HC AK AP 11 /97, 2 Robertson J . 
i-1
3 K 1· New Zealand Police, above n, 5 Robertson J. 
i-1-1 D 1· New Zealand Police (25 June 2004) HC AK C Rl-2004-404-00005 I, para I Frater J. 
145 D v Nell' Zealand Police, above n 144, para 32 Frater J. 
146 Queen 1· X (21 February 2005) DC WN, para 6 Judge Tuohy. 
i-1
7 Adams on Criminal Law. above n 78, CJ I 40.05(h) . 
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judges and different courts in how pre-trial suppression is granted. 148 This claim is 
validated when the case law is examined. 
-I Medical Evidence 
The variability with which medical evidence is considered in interim name 
suppression applications by judges is also concerning. In once case a defendant who 
was suffering from cardiac problems was granted name suppression, because the 
stress associated with publication of his name could adversely affect his medical 
condition.
149 
In contrast, in Tukaokao v Pohce, the defendant suffered from 
inoperable terminal cancer. 150 Publication of his name was expected to cause 
additional stress, which would aggravate his condition. The Court accepted that the 
allegations may even '·hasten his demise. '' 15 1 This. coupled with other personal factors 
was insufficient to justify name suppression. 
5 Conclusion 
Various trends can be determined from the cases. Some judges will more 
readily grant interim suppression when it is clear that publication is unlikely to result 
in other victims coming forward or new evidence being discovered. When such 
factors are missing, the Prosecution must rely on the general principles of open justice 
and free expression, because there are no specific reasons dictating against 
suppression. 
It is also clear that considerations about the presumption of innocence are 
linked to fears that a potentially well-earned reputation may be destroyed by 
publication of pending charges. Some members of the judiciary seem to recognise 
that to harm a potentially innocent person may have a devastating effect on their 
148 
Boyes, above n 9, A2. 
149 
M, W, Band K v Serious Fraud Office (26 January 200 I) HC HAM AP 124/00, para 20 Randerson J. 
150 
Tukaokao v Police (28 February 200 I) HC ROT AP3/0 I , paril 3 Rodney Hansen J. 
151 Tukaokao 1• Police, above n 150, para 14 Rodney Hansen J. 
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livelihood. Some judges now adopt a stance where they sit back and ask "Would the 
defendant's name be suppressed after an acquittal?'" If the answer is "yes'·, or even 
··probably'' interim suppression is granted. 152 But, other courts adhere closely to the 
Prock/er approach, stating that adverse effects to reputation are generally an 
unavoidable consequence of criminal proceedings and are not sufficiently out of the 
ordinary to warrant suppression. 
Missing from the judgments is a balancing of section 14 of the Bill of 
Rights.
153 
Too often. the courts are citing that open justice and free expression must 
be the starting point, with no consideration of whether an order is demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society, the test which the Court outlined 111 
Lewis.
154 
If courts had to think harder about whether the limitations on section 14 
were justified, different results may eventuate. On the other hand, there is no evidence 
that judges attempt to consider whether limiting the presumption of innocence is 
demonstrably justified either. 
Interim orders do not mark the end of an accountable justice system. This is 
because they do not permanently frustrate the media·s right to report court 
proceedings and only temporarily infringe the right to freedom of expression. 
However, there needs to be some consistency in their application. Currently some 
people obtain the benefits of suppression simply because their judge accords 
significant weight to the presumption of innocence. These inconsistencies are also 
concerning as there is no certainty for defendants or media outlets as to when the 
presumption will tip the balance in favour of suppression. For defendants an 
unsuccessful application for suppression may bring the very publicity that was trying 
to be avoided. These conclusions indicate that some reform may be needed of the law 
relating to pre-conviction suppression. 155 
15
" Director of Proceedings l' I. above n 93 , para 80 Frater J, R ,, K (21 February 200 I) DC CHCH T 
010512, 7JudgeNoble. 
153 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
15
-1 Lewis v Wilson & Horl(7n. above n 8. 559 Elias CJ for the Court. 
155 This is discussed in section XIII. 
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VI PERMANENT NAME SUPPRESSION 
It is not poss ible to be exhaustive about the factors that justify permanent 
name suppression and no single consideration is determinative. Broadly speaking, 
permanent name suppression will be available where the possible harm to the 
offender or their family by publicity, clearly outweighs the gravity of the crime and 
the advantages that accrue to the public as a result of di sclosure. 156 It will be harder to 
gain a permanent suppression order than an interim order, as considerations about the 
presumption of innocence do not apply and freedom of express ion and open justice 
are permanently infringed. 
A Nature of the Offending 
1 Serious Offe nding 
A relevant consideration is the nature of the offending and its seriousness. In 
R v Liddell (Liddell) a man had been convicted of serious sexual offences against 
boys at a school where he had been a counse llor. 157 The man was initially granted 
permanent name suppression , in order to protect hi s famil y.158 The Court of Appeal 
d · 159 reverse suppress ion: 
The juri sdi cti on does extend to a name suppress ion order fo r the perso n convicted in 
such a case, but when a convicti on is fo r [a] seri ous cri me it can onl y be very rare!) 
that the inte rests of th e offender's fa mil y w ill justi fy an o rder suppress ing 
di scl os ure ... of identity. 
The Court of Appeal has made it clear that sexual offenders cannot normally 
expect their names to be suppressed, because publicity warns the public of the 
156 Roberts ,. Police, above n 75, ._i3 1 Wyli e J. 
157 
R v Liddell, above n 28, Cooke P for the Court. 
158 
Liddell' s two sons attend ed the schoo l where th e abuse had occurred: R ,. Lie/de// , above n 28, 544 
Cooke P fo r the Court. 
159 R ,, Liddell, above n 28, 547 Cooke P fo r th e Co urt . 
offender and may result in other victims coming forward. 160 In Liddell, the offender's 
job as a counsellor meant that the Court could not discount the possibility that there 
may be further victims. This was coupled with the need to alleviate future risk of re-
offending, so publication of Liddell's name was desirable. 161 
However, in cases decided by lower courts sexual offenders have had their 
names suppressed.
162 
In the case of R v Kealey, permanent name suppression was 
initially awarded to a man who had been convicted of I O counts of indecent assault. 163 
This was a serious crime, there was a lack of personal circumstances justifying 
suppression and the public interest in knowing the man's identity was present. 164 
Unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeal was scathing of the sentencing Judge's decision 
and overturned the order. 165 
Like in interim applications, if further victims are unlikely to come forward, 
this tells against publication. In R v W suppression was awarded to a man convicted of 
incest, despite the victims desiring publication. 166 Suppression was thought necessary 
to protect the man's health, his innocent wife 167 and because the offending was 
historical: "The delay indicates to me there is no public interest in publication of the 
name on account of the possibility of other victirns. '' 168 By suppressing the man's 
name the public interest in denouncing the conduct and deterring others is overruled. 
A further issue with sexual offenders gaining suppression is that the public are denied 
160 
Prockter v R, above n 71, 300 (CA) Thomas J for the Cowt. 
161 R v Liddell, above n 28, 545 Cooke P for the Court. 
16
: D v Ne11· Zealand Police above n 144, Frater J; I,, New Zealand Police , above n 139. France J. 
163 
R v Kealey (200 I) 18 CRNZ 602, 603 (CA) Thomas J for the Court. 
164 R v Kealey, above n 163, 604 Thomas J for the Cow1. 
165 R v Kect!e)', above n 163, 60-+ Thomas J for the Court. 
166 
R v W (30 May 2003) HC CHCH T 62/0 I. para 19 Panckhurst J. The\ ictims were over 16 and desired 
publication so the uppression is not automatic, but involves discretion: Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139. 
167 
In Liddell the offender's wife was far more fragile than the wife in this case and in Liddell there was the 
need to consider the son's well being, factors absent here: R ,. Liddell, above 11 28, 545 Cooke P for the 
Court. 
168 
R v W, above 11 166, para 20 Panckhurst J. 
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knowing the character of the person seeking suppression. This public interest is seen 
as strong in cases of sexual offending. dishonesty and drug use. 169 
However, this public interest is being not being truly considered in some 
decisions. For example, a businessman who was considered a prolific child porn 
viewer gained permanent name suppression. 170 This was despite the man being 
convicted of 40 child pornography charges and being in possession of 62,000 
images. 171 The man was granted name suppression, because he suffered from 
depression, which led him to ·'binge" on pornography. 172 The Judge was persuaded by 
the fact that the man had sought psychiatric assistance before he was arrested. 173 This 
sets a dangerous precedent that if you can demonstrate depression to the court; you 
may gain the benefit of suppression. It seems extraordinary that a person convicted of 
a large number of grave offences should avoid the punishment of having their name 
published. The public should have the ability to know the character of the person in 
question so that they may choose to avoid him. or keep their children away from him. 
This decision is also inconsistent with the decision in Lerner v Department of 
Internal Affairs where it was felt that offending involving child pornography justified 
publication. 174 Priestly J called such conduct ''pernicious'·, recognising society's 
repulsion of it. 175 He felt that there was a strong need to denounce the conduct and 
deter others from engaging in such behaviour. 176 
169 
R v Liddell, above n 28, Cooke P for the Court: /VI, , Police , above n 4. Fisher J ; Roberts v Police. above 
n 75 , Wylie J. 
170 
He was the only one out of six CanterbLir) men caught in an international sting to gai n the benefit of 
name suppression: John Henzell ·'Name Secret in Porn Case'" ( I July 2005) The Press Christchurch A3. 
The author was unable to obtain thejudgment in this case. 
171 
These images depicted to11ure. urination and bestiality .. 1ame Secret in Porn Case", abO\e n 170. A3. 
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~ "Name Secret in Porn Case·'. above n 170. A3. 
173 '·Name Secret in Porn Case". above n 170. A3. 
174 
Lerner" Department ()/Infernal Affairs (7 May 2004) HC AK CRI 2003 404 200 Priestley J. 
175 
Priestly J was concerned that by subscribing to websites to access po rnograp hic material , financial 
assistance was given to th ose who exploit young children: Lerner v Department ()f Internal A/fairs. above n 
174. para 7 Priestley J. 
176 Lerner, , Departmenr ()f Internal Affairs. abo\ en 174. para 14 Priestley J 
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The courts should be extremely reluctant to order suppression to those 
convicted of serious offences, because publicity is part of the expected cost of 
committing a criminal offence. 
2 Trivial Offending 
The Court of Appeal has recognised that there may be cases where someone 
has been acquitted or even convicted of a '·truly trivial charge" where "the damage 
caused to the accused by publicity would plainly outweigh any genuine public 
interest"' in publication. 177 For example. an All Black player was convicted of a 
'·technical assault'· against his wife. The damage to the rugby player and his family by 
publicity were said to outweigh any interest in publication. 178 In cases of first time 
offending, involving trivial charges, concerns about protecting the community from 
future offending are lessened. 
The practice of diversion is relevant to this question of name suppression for 
those charged with truly trivial offences. Diversion occurs where a person who is 
charged with an offence has the matter adjourned by the court, and during the 
adjournment engages in community activities at the police's supervision. Upon 
satisfactory completion of the activities. the police request a v. ithdrawal of the charge 
and no conviction is entered. 179 
Diversion is normally granted to first time offenders on minor charges. 
Because of this, a practice developed in some New Zealand courts 180 that diverted 
defendants would automatically have their names suppressed by judges, because of 
177 
R v Liddell, above n 28, 547 Cooke P for the Court. 
178 
Amanda Spratt ·'Assault All Black's name revealed on net" (27 Februa1') 2005) The New Zealand 
Herald Auckland 3. 
179 
Burrows and Wi Ison, above n 13, 23. Under, section 36( I B) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 the 
Registrar can make a permanent suppression order if the police consent to the making of such an order. The 
following discussion does not relate to such instances. 
18° For example, in Auckland District Court the practice is to order a prohibition on the publication of 
names where diversion i granted: Younger v Police (31 October 2000) HC AK A 169/00, para 2 Robertson 
J. 
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their participation in diversion. 18 1 The diversion scheme allows first time offenders to 
rehabilitate themselves and make amends out of the public glare; hence name 
suppression may be considered appropriate to meet these aims. 182 
However, two recent decisions have held otherwise. Robertson J believes a 
judge's discretion applies equally to dive11ed defendants as to any other kind. 183 
Hence, defendants should not assume that suppression will be exercised in their 
favour. His Honour made the persuasive argument that if Parliament intended that all 
diverted defendants enjoy name suppression, a statutory provision should be enacted 
to such effect. 18-+ 
The reasoning of Robertson J has been recently followed by Judge Ryan, who 
refused suppression to a man charged with possessing a rifle without a licence and 
discharging it without reasonable excuse. 185 The Judge said the fact that the man had 
completed diversion satisfactorily was an insufficient reason to justify suppression. 186 
These cases demonstrate the strength of the open justice principle and the need for 
uninhibited free expression, even in cases of insignificant offending. 
It should also be noted that name suppression following an acquittal is not 
automatic, but the Court of Appeal has held that the discretion to award suppression 
may be more readily exercised. 187 However. it has been noted that the public may also 
have an interest in knowing about an acquittal. 188 In the case of R v Dare suppression 
was refused following an acquittal, because of legitimate public interest. 189 It is clear 
that in occasional cases the public desire the identity of an acquitted person to remain 
181 Burrows and Wilson, above n 13, 23. 
182 
Simon Hendery '·Privac) versus the Public's Right to K11 01,," ( 16 Januai) 2000) The Nell' Zealand 
Herald Auckland A 16. 
183 Younger v Police, abo\'e n 180, para 7 Priestley J. 
is-1 Younger" Police, above n 180, para 9 Priestle) J. 
185 
Robyn Bristow "Man tries to protect identity" (4 August 2004) The Press Christchurch Local News. 
180 
Robyn Bristow, above n 185, Local News. 
187 R ,. Liddell, above n 28, 547 Cooke P for the Court 
188 
R 1· Liddell, above n 28, 54 7 Cooke P for the Court. The Cou rt adopted the reasoning in R v D(G) ( 1991) 
63 CCC 3(d) 134. 
189 
In this ea ea seconda1') school teacher was acquitted of indecent assault: R v Dare (25 June 1998) CA 
195/98 Judgment of the Court. 
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suppressed. For example. a Nelson man was recently acquitted of both the murder and 
manslaughter of his disabled daughter, despite the existence of a videotaped 
confession in which he admitted ending her life. He was granted permanent name 
suppression and there was little public appetite in discovering his identity. 190 
It seems iniquitous that suppression may be refused even where someone is 
acquitted, or completes diversion based on a trivial charge, but is given in more 
serious cases. 
B Circumstances Relating to the Offender 
An examination will be undertaken of the offender's personal circumstances. 
The courts have recognized that it usual for embarrassment and adverse personal 
consequences to accompany any criminal proceeding. For this reason they will be 
looking for some damage out of the ordinary in order to justify suppression. 191 
The court will look to the mental and physical health of the offender. For 
example, it has been accepted in some courts that suppression is appropriate where 
the risk of an offender's suicide is high. 192 But, in other decisions a hard line has been 
adopted towards su icide. 193 The Court of Appeal has said that the court must be 
sensitive to the possibility of an offender taking his or her life. But, ··the fact that a 
psychiatrist is of the opinion that there is a risk that he or she will commit suicide 
does not mean that name suppression will automatically follow." 194 Instead, it is a 
relevant factor to be taken into consideration. 195 In three recent decisions, expert 
190 
A Holmes poll found an overwhelming majority of people did not want the identity of the man and his 
family revealed, which lead to Television New Zealand changing its mind about appealing the suppression 
decision: "Tapu Misa: Sense of Perspective needed in Name Suppression Debate" (9 March 2005) The New 
Zealand Herald Auckland A 12. 
191 
Le11•is 1• Wilson and Horton, above n 28. 559 Elias CJ for the Court. 
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F v Police ( 16 February I 984) HC HAM I 3/84 Bisson J; R v W, abO\ e n 166, Panckhurst J. 
193 
McDonald 1• R (24 August 1998) CA 84/98 Judgment of the Cow1. 
194 
McDonald v R, above n 193, 5 Judgment of the Court. 
195 
McDonaldv R. above n 193, 6 Judgment of the Court. This hard line approach to suicide does not sit 
well\ ith an older Court of Appeal decision which accepts that name suppression may be warranted where 
the defendant's safety or that of their family is in real danger. because ofa third party's threats: See 
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psychiatric evidence has considered the risk of suicide high, yet name suppression has 
been declined in each case. 196 
Obviously, the courts are guarding against people claiming they are suicidal in 
order to have their names suppressed, but arguably there is a real public interest in 
preventing people from committing suicide. It is difficult to justify that the public 
interest in open justice outweighs the risk of a person dying. Suicide risk should not 
justify automatic name suppression, but where a claim is found to be supported by 
expert medical testimony, the courts should consider the matter serious ly. ff name 
suppression 1s not granted in such dire circumstances, one wonders when it is 
appropriate. 
Recent case law 197 shows a growing acceptance to order suppression where 
a family member's life is in danger because of illness. Thus, there is a difference in 
the way that an offender and their family are treated. The courts obviously have more 
empathy for the innocent third party, then for the suicidal offender, who has 
perpetrated the wrongdoing. 
The court may order suppression where the defendant's efforts at self-
rehabilitation may be rendered fruitless. 198 It seems odd that the Courts are willing to 
assist in the rehabilitation of offenders, but will not protect them so readily when they 
are suicidal. Previous good character and a lack of previous criminal convictions are 
insufficient to justify suppression, as is evidence of acceptance of responsibil ity. 199 
Broadcasting Co,poration c!f" NeH' Zealand v Attorney General [ 1982] I ZLR 120, 135 (CA) Richardson 
J. In cases of suicidal tendencies or danger from a third party, the rationale for protection arguably should 
be the same. In each case publication will negatively affect an offender's well being. 
196 
Regina lutomski & Anie/a Mackiewic:: v Accidenl Compensation Co,poration (2 July 2002) HC WN AP 
119 & 120/02, Hammond J; Ke/let 1· Police (2005) 21 CRNZ 743 (HC) Chisholm J: CTR 1• Police [2005] 
DCR 341 (HC) Chisholm J. 
197 
Please see the discussion on page 39. 
198 
B v B (6 April 1993) HCA~ 4/92 Blanchard J, D 1· Neir Zealand Police, abO\e n 144, Frater J. 
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le11•is v Wilson and Horton , above n 28, 563 Elias CJ for the Court. 
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Consideration is also given to an offender's employment. For example, in T v 
Police , a man was charged with aggravated robbery. 200 Permanent suppression was 
given on the grounds that there would be an adverse impact on a centre for 
intellectually handicapped children. which was the man's place of employment.201 In 
S v R, suppression of the name of a teacher acquitted of assault was in the interests of 
the pupils at the school.202 In the case of L v R, suppression was ordered where L, who 
worked in the multi-media design industry was discharged without conviction after 
importing objectionable images. The Court said that publication would greatly 
impede her ability to pursue her occupation.203 
In other cases, detriment to employment has been insufficient to tip the 
balance in favor of suppression. In the case of Leef v Police , the court accepted that 
the defendant may lose his job, but held that his future employment prospects was not 
a factor to be given major weight. 20..i In R v Hennes. the defendant was acquitted of 
the charges and suppression was refused. 205 This was despite his employer writing a 
letter to the Court that stated that his employement would be terminated if publication 
occurred.
206 
The Court of Appeal in Prock/er made it clear that harm to employment 
is a natural consequence of criminal proceedings and that something more than 
"extreme hardship'' is required.207 Arguably. some of the decisions of the lower courts 
are inconsistent with this threshold. 
The Court will examine the impact of publicity on the offender's family, but it 
has been said that: ·'anguish to the innocent family of an offender is an inevitable 
result of many convictions for serious crime. Only in an extraordinary case could it 
outweigh ... the general principle of open justice:·208 So shame or embarrassment is 
200 
TI' Police (29 'ovember 199i) HC AK AP 282/91 Tompkins J. 
201 T v Police, above n 200. 3 Tompkins J. 
202 S ,, R ( 1994) 12 CRNZ 290 (HC) Williamson J. 
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o:; L v R (5 February 2004) HC AK A 82-03, para 15 Nicholson J. 
204 
Leefv Police (6 December 2000) HC AK A 246/00. para 31 Williams J. 
205 R v Hennes (20 October 2000) HC W T 840-00 McGechan J. 
206 R ,, Hennes. above n 205, paras 5, 12 McGechan J. 
207 Prock/er v R, above n 71, 294 Thomas J for !he Couri. 
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insufficient to displace the presumption.209 The Cou1t of Appeal in Liddell 
demonstrated how difficult it will be to show the requisite level of harm. Jn Liddell 
psychiatrists believed that publication of Liddell"s name would have a devastating 
effect on his wife: "Publication could ... if not destroy her, knock her down so hard 
that she wouldn't be able to help herself or her sons any longer.''21 0 This was coupled 
with the fact that the offender's two sons were students at the school where the abuse 
had taken place and would "almost inevitably have to leave [their] school because of 
extensive newspaper and television pub! icity ... if their father's name was available for 
publication."
2 11 
The Court declined to suppress the offender's name, holding that 
suppression of the wife and sons' names would be sufficient to protect them.212 
Consistent with this approach is Curran v Police.213 There, the defendant's 
wife was suffering from a history of recurrent major depressive episodes and 
agoraphobia.2
1
..i The defendant's mother was also highly depressed and likely to be 
exposed to serious personal abuse upon publication of her son·s name. 21 5 The Judge 
held that the damage was not sufficiently out of the ordinary and disproportionate to 
the public interest in open reporting.21 6 Similarly. the fragile mental health of a 
businessman's wife convicted for trading and possessing objectionab le material was 
insufficient to justify suppression of her husband·s name. This was despite it being 
argued that publication could lead to "real tragedy" 217 
The courts seem to be drawing a distinction between mental and physical 
illness. and giving greater weight to the latter. The Court of Appeal has recognised 
that if the defendant's physical safety or that of their family is in danger then this may 
:w
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justify suppression.2 18 In the case of T v Police, an application for permanent name 
suppression was successful because of the offender's father's poor health.2 19 The 
father's health was described as '·extremely fragile··. The court believed that 
publication could be described as a matter of life and death for the father, and so the 
public interest in disclosure was outweighed.220 
In a similar vein. a suppression order was granted in The Queen v M because 
of the ill health of the defendants' wife .221 She suffered from angina and a worsening 
cardiac condition. Harrison J said:222 
There is no justification for imperi I ing the health of an innocent woman for the sake 
of the so-called wider public good, or at a more basic level nothing more than a 
masquerade for curiosity or prurience in knowing her husband ' s name. 
Thus it can be detected that the courts are concerned about innocent people suffering 
through publication of their loved ones· names.223 But, it should be remembered that 
in order to constitute the least infringement on the right to freedom of expression, 
suppression orders can be made in respect of family members names in order to 
protect them, as they are connected with proceedings.224 
The court must also consider possible ramifications in the community when 
name suppression is granted. with rumors escalating about innocent people. For 
example, a man received permanent name suppression after being convicted of 
attempting to procure sex with a young girl. 225 The District Court Judge granted 
suppression because he was concerned about the effect of publication on the 
218 Broadcasting COJporation of New Zealund ,, Attorney General. abO\e n 195, 135 Richardson J. 
210 T v Police (22 Apri I 2005) HC DUN CRl:2005-l 1212 Chisholm J. 
220 T v Police, above n 219, para 12 Chisholm J. 
221 The Queen v M ( I O September 2003) HC NWP TI /03 Harrison J. 
222 The Queen ,, M, abO\ e n 221. para 15 Harrison J. 
223 It is concerning that courts seem more willing to accept suppression in cases where physical harm can 
be pointed to, as oppo ed to mental illness. This could be because the latter is more difficult to assess. but 
hould be considered equall) as serious given how deva tating mental illness can be. 
22
-1 Criminal Justice Act 1985. s 140. 
225 Police 1• M. above n 65 . para I Panckhurst and Chisholm J.I. 
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offender's business and his employees. In addition the Judge thought publicity might 
affect the offender's rehabilitation.226 
Rumours began circulating about the offender's identity with three innocent 
Christchurch businessmen being targeted.227 The High Court overturned the 
suppression order holding that the offence was a serious one, and neither the 
offending nor the personal circumstances of the offender justified suppression. The 
Court was concerned about such damaging speculation: ''That such has occurred 
illustrates why open reporting of criminal proceedings is accorded such primacy in 
this country. ''228 The fact that name suppression orders can harm the innocent is one 
compelling reason for limiting their application to extraordinary circumstances. As 
Peter Jenkins notes. often the only antidote to scurrilous rumors is the truth, and not 
I . n9 attempts to concea ,r.--
C Conclusion 
Scott Optican argues that ··The case law does provide the criteria, but it is not 
being taken seriously enough in the lower courts."230 An examination of the case law 
does present some inconsistencies in the weight accorded to various factors. Overall, 
a more stringent examination needs to be undertaken of whether the harm from 
publication will truly outweigh the interests involved in disclosure and if the limits 
imposed on free expression are justified. Some inconsistency is possible inevitable in 
name suppression applications because it is a discretionary measure, to be exercised 
based on judgment rather than firm criteria. 
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6 Police ,. M, above n 65, paras '.21-22 Panckhurst and Chisholm JJ. 
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VII PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
A The Law 
The public will naturally have a degree of interest in those with a high public 
profile being involved in criminal activity. The leading case is Lewis, where an 
American billionaire was charged with importing cannabis into New Zealand during a 
visit to watch the American's Cup.231 He pleaded guilty and made a substantial 
donation to charity. At sentencing, he was discharged without conviction and his 
name suppressed.232 This was relatively unusual. statistics show that in the year of his 
conviction only 0.3% of offenders gained name suppression for a drug offence.233 
The Court of Appeal reversed the order, finding that the man's status as a 
successful businessman. community leader and philanthropist was irrelevant. in the 
absence of him suffering special harm through publicity. The Court said to hold 
otherwise would be to suggest that ··prominent members of the community should 
receive name suppression because there may be media interest in such people."234 
The Coutts have said they cannot enter into a discussion as to whether the 
degree of pub I ic interest in a case is appropriate:23 5 
In the absence of identified harm from the publicity. v. hich clearly extends beyond 
what is normal in such cases, the presumption of pub I ic entitlement to the 
information prevails. Any other approach ri sks creating a privilege for those who are 
prominent which is not available to others in the community and imposing 
censorship on information according to the Courts perception of its value. 
231 
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m Ministry of Justice, above n 51, Table 2. 
234 
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This is a clear direction from the Court that those with a high public profile should 
not be treated favourably. 
B Perceptions 
It is important that the law does not discriminate against certain groups 111 
society. For this reason it is disturbing that critics argue that those with a high public 
profile receive name suppression readily, in breach of the lewis guidelines.236 Scott 
Optican argues that there is a correlation between the higher a person's standing in 
the community and the likelihood of name suppression. But, he believes that on 
appeal such orders are seldom maintained.237 Unfortunately the Ministry of Justice 
holds no statistics showing the number of suppression orders uphe ld or overturned on 
appeal, or even the number appealed , so this claim cannot be validated.238 Journalist 
and media law lecturer, Steven Price, argues that ·'name suppression ... still works well 
most of the time-that is, when there aren't celebrities involved.'"239 
There is also a discernible public feeling that name suppression 1s easily 
granted to the rich and famous. 240 Philip Morgan, QC,241 believes that a lack of 
information may be the reason for this perception: ''If there is a perception that people 
only get name suppression because they are famous that is a bit misconceived 
because ... most of the reasons for name suppression are suppressed as well because 
they are the identifying particulars.''242 The perception is disturbing because, --Public 
faith in the justice system depends on confidence that a person's status ... is irrelevant 
to the treatment they receive from the court."243 It is appropriate to consider some of 
D
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the recent decisions involving celebrities so that allegations of preferential treatment 
can be evaluated. 
C The Reality 
Examples of celebrities gaining name suppression are abundant, such as the 
All Black who pleaded guilty to assaulting his pregnant wife and subsequently 
received permanent name suppression. The player was involved in a "technical 
assault'' with his wife. 
2
-1-1 Following an argument the player: "stopped her, grabbed 
her and pushed her. .. there was a struggle as the defendant attempted to pull his wife 
back home."
245 
It must be remembered that no matter how trivial the altercation was, 
it was thought serious enough to be prosecuted and the player did not contest the 
charge. 
The player was bought before the Waitakere Family Violence Court, a court 
which attempts to strengthen and re-habilitate families following domestic 
violence.
246 
The Judge clearly believed that publication of the player's name would be 
inconsistent with the court's therapeutic operation. However, the Judge was 
concerned about the effect of publication jeopardising any reconciliation between the 
player and his wife.
247 
Importantly, the wife (and victim) did not want her husband's 
name pub! ished, a factor that the.Judge must consider under section 140( 4A). 248 
However, it is questionable whether the harm to the player's family clearly 
outweighs the public interest in disclosure. 249 As the courts have repeatedly noted, an 
unfortunate repercussion of criminal proceedings is that the defendant's family will 
2
-i
4
Amanda Spratt, above n 178, 3. The author was unable to obta in a copy of the judgment from the 
Waitakere Family Violence Court. 
2
-1
5 
Robe11 Stewart '·Counsel Memorandum Post-Hearing" ( 17 January 2005). 
246 Stewai1, above n 245, I. 
2
-1
7 Stewart, above n 245, 2. 
248 
Russell Brown ··Lot in the line-up'' (March 19-25 2005) Vo! 198 Nell' Zealand Listener Wellington. 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 140(4A). 
2
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Lewis,, Wilson & Horton, above n 8, 563-564 Elia CJ for the Cou11. 
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suffer distress .250 It would be unfortunate to subject a young family to a compulsory 
public spectacle, but that is not sufficient for name suppression. 
There is a clear pubic interest in knowing the player's identity because All 
Blacks act as role models for young New Zealander's. The ·'Kiwi kids are Weetbix 
kids" advertisement equates success with being an All Black. If such figures are not 
appropriate candidates for young people to look up to, then society has an interest in 
knowing this. 251 If an All Black is exposed and punished for assaulting his wife, 
children can be taught that this is unacceptable behaviour for anyone of any status. As 
Brian Gardner, Manager of the ational etwork of Stopping Violence Services said: 
.. It can send a really powerful message to young men in New Zealand if people in 
those kind of positions stand up and say 'what I did was wrong. "'252 His comments 
were supported by groups like Women's Refuge who were outraged by the decision, 
arguing that it sent the message that All Black players would earn special 
treatment.253 The Judge didn't seem to recognise this legitimate public interest or the 
need for free expression and open justice: ··the non-publication order is not going to 
affect anyone outside this family" he said, when quite plainly it has .254 
The unfortunate factor in this case is that the name suppression order does not 
really appear to have benefited the player. given the speculation surrounding his 
identity.
255 
Given the assault was not particularly serious. it may have been better for 
the player to come out and reveal his behavior. in which case the matter would have 
been resolved in days. However. this would not have been to the victim's advantage. 
The name suppression order has also not benefited the team, given that the reputation 
250 R v Liddell, above n 28 , 5-t-t Cooke P for the Cou1i. 
251 
The counter argument is that children should not be exposed to such behavior, in case they attempt to 
emulate it. But, the public interest in knowing the true character of society's role models should override 
this concern. 
252 "'Anger at All Black suppression", above n I. 
253 ' ·Anger at All Black suppression", above n I. 
254 
Bridget Carter "'Judge grants name suppression to All Black who assaulted his wife" (9 December 2004) 
Tht! New Zealand Herald Auckland A3. 
255 
Brown. above n 2-t8, Louisa Wall "Come on ou t Mr X: You're Spoiling it for All" (19 March 2005) The 
Ne 11· Zealand Herald Auckland Spo1is News General. 
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of other innocent players was called into question, particularly those who were 
married and residing in Auckland.256 
It seems clear that the player's public profile was a concern for the Judge. As 
the Police Prosecutor noted, the only person to win a suppression order in these 
circumstances (that is, following a guilty plea) was another All Black in the seven 
year history of the court.257 While it might not have been the Judge's intention to treat 
people differently because of status, this is the end result. It is because of the player's 
profile in the community that the punitive publicity about the incident would have 
been intense, and this is consequently damaging to his family and his relationship 
with his wife. 
However, these considerations wouldn't apply if an ordinary person had 
committed the same act. As one journalist notes: ''Had he (the player) been an 
ordinary citizen this case would have passed without notice ... but its precisely because 
he is an All Black that the attention and opprobrium would have been out of 
proportion to the crime''258 This is where the rub is, the player's fame gives him 
rewards that no ordinary citizen enjoys, but that fame also has the potential to 
completely undermine him. This results in celebrities being able to rely on their fame 
to gain suppression more easily, despite the courts' insistence that all are equal before 
the law. 
The Dick Dargaville case is a further illustration of this point.259 Mr 
Dargaville, a National Party Maori Vice President, assaulted his partner by hitting her 
across her face. 260 I-le was granted a section 19 discharge26 1 like the All Black player, 
256 
12 players heralded from Auckland in the NPC or played for '"The Blues" in the Super 12 in 2004, 
indicating that they lived in Auckland at that time: All Blacks Official website 
<http: //www.allblacks.com 'index.cfm?layout- teamArchive > (last accessed 2 October 2005). 
257 Ca11er, above n 254, A3. 
258 
'·Tapu Misa: Sense of Perspective needed in name suppression debate", above n 190, A 12. 
259 
This case precede the Court of Appeal decision in Le11 ·is where it was expressly articulated that public 
people should be treated the same as everyone else before the law. However, this position was present in 
the case law pre-Lewis: New Zealand Police v Richard Dick Darga1·ille ( I-+ May 1999) DC Kaikohe, I 
Judge Everitt. 
260 ··Outrage over Mana Secrecy" (7 July 1999) The Evening Post Wellington Edition 3 3. 
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and received permanent name suppression. 262 Name Suppression was granted on the 
unique ground that publication of the fact that he had appeared in a criminal court and 
was discharged without conviction for assault .. would lead people to start thinking 
what has gone on there and why."263 The Judge is insinuating that people are only 
going to be interested because of the status of the person involved and that this is 
somehow inappropriate. Judging the public interest is not the Court's duty. Again, we 
seem to have an order made based on who the person is. rather than why an order is a 
justified limitation of free speech. 
The other reason for granting suppression was to ensure Dargaville did not 
lose mana.264 Mana is something that is earned: '·Everybody from the moment of 
conception has mana, then we earn it from our actions ... but as quick as you give it to 
your leaders it can be taken away."265 If someone is not deserving of mana, the public 
and especially their people have an interest in knowing this. This case illustrates 
someone's standing in the community aiding them in getting name suppression. 
A further example is Hayden Roulston, an Olympic cyclist who received 
interim name suppres ion for an assault allegation. Interim name suppression allowed 
him to compete in the Olympics. without the allegations being made public.266 
However, arguably there was a strong public interest in knowing that a representative 
of New Zealand had been charged with assault, given that such a person is seen as a 
role model. 
:!
61 An interesting examination could be undertaken of the ability of celebrities to receive discharges without 
conviction for their misdemeanors. but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
:!6'.' Dargaville received permanent name suppression but later revealed himself as being the man at the 
centre of this case: Helen Bain "Top Nat: l ·m the 'mana· case man" ( 14 July 1999) The Dominion 
Wellington Edition 2 I. 
:!
6
:! Ne11• Zealand Police 1· Richard Dick Dargm·ille. above n 259. 4 Judge Everitt. 
:!
63 New Zealand Police v Richard Dick Dargm•ille, abo,e n 259. 4 Judge Everitt. 
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~ Nell' Zealand Police v Richard Dick Dargal'ille. abO\e n 259. 4 Judge Everitt. This is a troubling point 
in itself given that mana is accorded to prominent figures in Maoridom. raising inequality issues. 
: 65 Nathan Te Anga ''The meaning of Mana" (17 Jui) 1999) /Vaikato Times Hamilton Edition 2 15. 
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Roulston was then granted further name suppression, until the outcome of his 
trial was known. It was argued that publicity would damage Roulston's career, 
making it difficult for him to carry out a sporting contract overseas. It was felt that to 
jeopardise the contract was not advisable. given that Roulston could be found 
innocent.267 This is disturbing, because in so many cases negative employment 
repercussions are seen as a natural consequence of being charged with a criminal 
offence and have been held to be insufficient to justify suppression.268 
At least in this case Roulston was not granted permanent anonymity for his 
behaviour, so could not shelter from punitive publicity forever. Hence, freedom of 
expression and open justice were not curtailed. Eventually, the public was made 
aware of Roulston's character, so no fa<;:ade was indefinitely portrayed. But the 
bottom line is, name suppression was granted so that Roulston could compete in an 
Olympic sport and avoid negative publicity which could jeopardise his sporting 
career. considerations inapplicable to "Joe Average:· The publicity is always going to 
be far less for "Joe Average··. than if it's Roulston, or any other public figure, and 
consequently '·Joe Average" is unlikely to receive name suppression. 
There is the interesting case of the "high ranking foreigner" who was granted 
permanent name suppression.269 The man was charged with doing an indecent act 
with intent to offend and indecent assault.270 The man was eventually granted a 
section 347 discharge due to insufficient evidence.271 
Two factors were particularly significant in persuading Judge Tuohy to grant 
name suppression. Firstly, there was medical evidence indicating that the man was 
267 
John Henzel I and Amanda Warren ··Accused athlete to fight charges" (27 Oct 2004) The Press 
Christchurch Edition 2 4. 
268 R ,. Prock/er, above n 71, 299 Thomas J for the Court. 
269 This was how the defendant was described by The Sunday Star Times : Wall and Watt, above n 3. 
270 These are offences against the Crimes Act 1961 , sections I '.26 and 135( I )(a). The man had engaged a 
young woman to I ive and work as his children's nann). The Crown alleged that one evening the man 
entered the nanny's room, stood beside her bed and masturbated himself to ejaculation: The Queen v X ( 18 
October '.2004) C A299/04, paras 4-7 Hammond J for the Court. 
271 Crimes Act 1961, s 347. 
48 
suffering from depression as a result of the charges. Medical treatment was 
considered necessary.272 Secondly. affidavit evidence considered that if the man 's 
name was published in relation to the charges, albeit linked with the discharge order, 
hi s employment and career could be jeopardised, to the same extent as if he were 
convicted.
273 
As has been di scussed above, in other cases these reasons have been 
insufficient to justify suppression.27 -1 
The Judge also believed that thi s was the type of case where odium will stick 
in the public' s mind, despite the lack of conviction. 275 Thi s fails to give any weight to 
the public 's ability to distinguish a conviction from an acquittal. The Judge was 
concerned that the likelihood of extensive publication was high.276 But, the Court of 
Appeal has already made clear that an inquiry into the degree of publication is not the 
,77 
court's duty.-
It can be gleamed from this decision that the Judge was concerned that the 
harm caused by publicity would have catastrophic effects fo r the man and his family. 
This harm is particularly significant given that the man was not convicted of the 
offence.
278 
For this reason it is arguable that Judge Tuohy came to the correct 
outcome in the case by suppressing the name of the man. given the dramatic 
consequences disclosure would have brought to hi s career and family. The key factor 
here is that the seriousness of the harm involved. exists only because of the man 's 
high standing in the community. Despite the correct outcome, one aspect of the 
Judge's reasoning process is concerning. The judgment fails to give any consideration 
272 Queen v X, above n 146, para 5 Judge Tuohy. 
273 Queen v X, above n 146, para 5 Judge Tuohy. 
274 
For emplo) ment see Prockter v R, above n 71 , 299 Thomas J for the Court. For depression see R 1· 
Liddell, above n 28 , 544 Cooke P for the Cou rt. 
275 Queen v X, above n 146, para 7 Judge Tuohy. 
276 Queen 1• X, above n 146, para 7 Judge Tuoh). 
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278 
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to freedom of expression; this Bill of Rights freedom is not mentioned, never mind 
balanced. 
D Conclusion 
The recent spate of cases involving celebrity name suppression can be 
explained with reference to the degree of harm which will eventuate. Those with a 
high public profile do get their names suppressed more readily, and this is justified by 
judges on the grounds that publicity will be harmful and will outweigh the crime 
committed. As Steven Price says ·'If judges treat celebrities leniently by giving them 
name suppression, it's because they're factoring in the likelihood that the media will 
treat them more punitively then anyone else accused of a similar crime.''279 The media 
has one rule for celebrities and another for everyone else.280 The problem with 
granting name suppression to celebrities is that they allow maintenance of a public 
image which is at odds with a private reality. Celebrities maintain the benefit of a 
reputation which has not been earned.281 
Ironically, even though it appears that those with a high public profile are 
gaining suppression for their misdemeanors, it may not be in their interests to do so. 
This is because when suppression orders are given to celebrities, guessing their 
identities increases public interest in cases that may have otherwise slipped by largely 
unnoticed. The celebrity drug bust scandal and its associated furor is a case on point 
here. 282 As Steven Price notes:283 
Celebrity guessing is hotter than Harry Potter. .. The forces of the law are outgunned 
by the power of public curiosity. Justice is blind, and gossip is nimble ... celebrities 
may we! I be best advised to forego the suppression application and take a quick 
round of bad publicity on the chin. 
279 Price, above n 239, C6. 
280 Steven Price '·Dialogue: Steven Price; Judges ought to explain their deci sions" (21 January 2000) The 
New Zealand Herald Auckland A 13 . 
281 ''Naming and Sha111i11g," (28 Febrnary 2005) The Dominion Post Wellington Edition 2 6. 
282 This case is discussed further at page 59. 
283 Price. above n 239, C6. 
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Overall, the courts' decisions result in a tension between their insistence that no-one 
receives special treatment before the law, and their constant suppressions for high-
profi le defendants. This is most troubling because it raises issues of equality before 
the law. 
VIII FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The Court of Appeal has made it clear that when judges are determining 
suppression applications they should start by considering whether the restriction on 
the right to freedom of expression is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.
284 
To decide whether the intrusion is justified there must be identification of a 
clear and justifiable objective sought by suppression. the means sought to achieve that 
objective must be proportionate to that objective and there must be a rational 
connection between the two.285 There must be "'as little interference as possible with 
the right or freedom affected.''286 Applying the reasoning from Drew, freedom of 
expression can be departed from if the particular circumstances and particular people 
involved in a case make this justifiable. 287 
For example, in the case of Iv New Zealand Police suppression was sought 
based partly on the fact that the defendant had been subjected to two physical 
attacks.
288 
The same person had been responsible for both attacks. Thus the object of 
suppression was to protect the defendant and his family. But suppression would not 
truly protect the family from this threat, since the attacker was already aware of the 
man's identity before publication.289 Hence, there was no rational connection between 
the object and the means sought to achieve it. Unfortunately, the Judge did not 
undertake this reasoning process. 
284 Lell'iS ,, Wilson & Horton, above n 8. para 43 Elias CJ for the Court. 
285 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Rel'iell' [2000] 2 "NZLR 9, para 17 (CA) Tipping J for the Court. 
286 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Rel'ie11•, above n 286. para 18 Tipping J for the Cow1. 
287 
Dre1v v Attorney General [2002] l NZLR 58, para 66 (CA) Blanchard J. This case was about the denial 
of legal representation to pri soners, but the comments relating to exercising discretion make the case 
applicable. 
288 I v Nell' Zealand Police, above n 139. para 24 France J. 
289 Iv New Zealand Police, above n 139. para 25 France J. 
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An examination of the case law indicates that judges do not conduct this 
exercise.290 Judges often cite section 14, or the passage from Liddell that hails the 
media as ·'surrogates of the public··,29 1 and then dispense with these matters when 
they consider whether to exercise their discretion. For example. it is common to see a 
whole host of personal reasons given in support of suppression, finished off with a 
concluding phrase dispensing with open justice and free expression: "I am satisfied 
that the personal matters raised outweigh the public interests in publication."'292 o 
consideration is given to actually justifying the limitation on the right. More 
concerning is the fact that some judges see the right as insignificant: ··It is the norm of 
openness which attaches to criminal proceedings which in my judgment should be 
emphasised in name suppression cases, rather than lofty appeals to section 14 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.''293 
A failure to consider whether suppression is reasonable and justifiable in the 
circumstances may lead to decisions which unduly limit section 14. 29-1 In addition, it 
may be shown that narrower suppression orders could be given, so that there is truly 
the least infringement on the right. For example, in the All Black case, suppression 
was sought to protect the player's family from harmful publicity. 295 The means sought 
were suppression orders prohibiting publication of the player's and his family's 
names.296 There is a rational connection between the aim and method sought to 
achieve it, but whether there is as little interference as possible with the right to 
freedom of expression is questionable. An order could have been made allowing 
publication of the name of the player and the nature of the assault, given the strong 
29° For example 1 ,, Ne11· Zealand Police , abO\ en 139, France J: Dr Nell' Zealand Police, above n I 44, 
Frater J ; The Queen v M, above n 221, Harrison J: T, , Police, above n 87, Panckhurst J: The Queen v X, 
above n I 46, Judge Tuohy: Regina r W, abo\'e n 166, Panckhurst J. This is just a selection , many of the 
cases cited in this paper failed to consider freedom of expression appropriately. 
::>
91 R ,, Liddell, above n 28, 546 Cooke P for the Court. 
::>
92 Lerner v Department of Internal Affairs, above n 174, para 22 Priestley J. 
'.'
93 Lerner, , Departmenl of Internal A.flairs, above n 174. para 37 Priestley J. 
29
.i By expressly articulating these considerations there is Jess likelihood of them being overlooked. See 
Burrows and Cheer, above n 15 , 643. 
295 Stewart, above n 245, 2. 
296 Stewart, above n 245, 2. 
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public interest in the case. There could have been a prohibition of the circumstances 
of the assault, including the fact it was his wife who was the victim, in order to shield 
her from publicity and protect their marriage. 
IX THECOLDHARDFACTS 
While it may seem to the casual observer that name suppression orders are 
granted frequently to offenders. this is not the case. Statistics from the Ministry of 
Justice demonstrate that in year ending 2004, name suppression orders were granted 
in 0.5 per cent of cases concerning convicted persons.297 This indicates that generally, 
judges are granting suppression only in exceptional circumstances. There has been no 
dramatic growth in the number of name suppression orders given to offenders in the 
period between 1995 and 2004. However, there has been a slight increase from 2002-
2004, from 0.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent of all convicted offenders receiving 
suppression.298 
Defendants convicted of sexual offences made up 26 per cent of all orders 
given.299 This is unsurpnsmg, given a large number of those would be automatic 
suppressions, or discretionary ones issued to protect the victim's identity. 
Interestingly, '·other violent" offenders make up 26 per cent of all orders made. 300 
This is partially explainable because of the high number of violent offending cases 
coming before the Courts, which in turn leads to more suppression orders being 
'01 granted.) Although violent offenders make up a large pa11 of the total number of 
suppression orders given. orders are only granted in 1.3 per cent of all cases.302 I per 
cent of those convicted of ··Other offences against the person''303 receive name 
297 Ministry of Justice, above n 51, Table 2. 
298 Ministry of Justice, above n 51 , Table 2 
299 Ministry of Justice, above n 51, Table I. All stat istics given in the following discuss ion relate to the year 
ending 2004. 
100 Ministry of Justice, above n 51, Table I. 
301 Ministry of Justice Com·iction and Sentencing of all Offenders 1992-2()() I (December 2002) Table 2.3 
302 Ministry of Justice, above n 51. Table 2. 
103 Offences categorised as .. other offences against the person" are mainly offences of obstructing or 
resisting po lice officers or other offic ial s, and sexua l, threatening and intimidation offences which are not 
included in the, iolent offences category. 
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suppression.304 In cases of property,305 drug, traffic or miscellaneous offending306 and 
in cases of offending against justice307 or good order,308 name suppression is given 111 
less than I per cent of all cases. 309 
So, overall the statistics available demonstrate that only in very few cases is 
name suppression granted to offenders. The principles of open justice and freedom of 
expression are not being trammeled over by the judiciary. While there might be 
questions about the appropriateness of name suppression in individual cases, the 
public should feel assured that the overall number of name suppressions granted 
every year is not significant. 
X REASONS 
The Court of Appeal has emphasized the importance of giving reasons for a 
suppression order, despite no invariable rule to that effect. In Le111is the judge failed to 
give reasons in court. which amounted to an error of law. 31 0 This requirement to give 
reasons is desirable as it forms an important part of openness in the administration of 
justice and is critical to the maintenance of public confidence in the judiciary. It 
ensures carefully rationalized decisions occur and enables appeal rights to be 
30
~ Ministry of Justice, above n 51. Table 2. 
305 
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exercised. The absence of reasons means that a cow1 exercising a supervisory 
jurisdiction cannot assess the lawfulness of what has occurred.311 
However, despite these factors judges are not always giving reasons for their 
decisions. Permanent name suppression was recently given to a Member of 
Parliament's pai1ner, following his conviction for assault on a female. Upon appeal, 
the decision was remitted back to the Trial Judge, because of concerns that no reasons 
were given for granting name suppression. 312 
There are also concerns that judges are not making their reasons available to 
the public. 313 For example, a Christchurch businessman was recently given permanent 
name suppression following a conviction for the malicious use of telephone. The 
Judge took the extraordinary step of issuing a prohibition on publication of the 
reasons for suppression.314 At least there were reasons given, meaning that a carefully 
rationalised decision did occur. However, by prohibiting publication of the reasons 
the public's ability to hold the justice system to account is hindered greatly. 
Presumably, the reasons for the order were so closely linked to the person's identity 
that one could not release the reasons without identifying the offender. However, the 
court did not even allow this to be released to the public. This is a great infringement 
on open justice. The public has a right to know why someone who has been convicted 
of an offence is not being subjected to publicity. 
When reasons are not given for a decision or the public are denied access to 
reasons, questions are raised about the appropriateness of the decision. Is the absence 
311 Lewis \' Wilson & Horton, abo\ en 8, 565-566 Elias CJ for the Court. 
'
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~ "MP, partner loses battle over name suppression" (5 December 2003) Waikato Times Hamilton General 
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313 The author attempted to gain written decisions for a number of cases and was denied access. For 
example. in the All Black case the Court simply declined to issue the order. In a high profile rape case 
where two men were convicted the author was told that no written material existed of the decision, as it was 
given in open court. Hence, if a member of the pub I ic is not in court when the decision is given, the reasons 
for the order cannot easily be ascertained. a high!) unsati sfactory outcome. In the case of R v Police, above 
n 129, the author was denied access to the decision because she was not a lawyer. This wrongly implies that 
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'
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of recorded, accessible reasons the result of busy Judges who are pressured for time, 
or a result of ad hoe decision making based on intuition rather then a careful 
balancing of the private and public considerations discussed?315 
XI THE MEDIA'S ROLE 
A Media Standing 
The media are obviously interested in name suppression decisions as such 
orders impact on their ability to repo1t freely about court proceedings. Therefore it is 
appropriate that the media should be recognised as interested parties in name 
suppression cases. The Court in R v L held that "·the news media does have and 
always has had the right to seek an audience and be heard on the question of 
suppression.''316 The Court held that its inherent jurisdiction allows it to hear 
submissions from the media.317 The media's standing in suppression cases extends to 
an ability to apply for discharge, rescission or variation of suppression orders.318 
The Court of Appeal in Liddell left open the issue of whether the Court has 
jurisdiction to grant the media leave to appeal in name suppression cases, because the 
media's arguments in that case were amalgamated with the Solicitor General's 
application. 319 A recent decision of Panckhurst J challenges the media's standing. 
since the point was left unaddressed in Lidde/1. 320 However. his statements ignore the 
fact that in other Court of Appeal decisions the media·s standing has been accepted, 
315 Jones. above n 23. 24. 
316 
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Newspaper Ltd [ 1991] 6 WAR 153. 
317 
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Deobhakta. 
318 
R r L, above n 316, Smell ie J : A v B ( 11 May 1999) HC AK CP3 I 0/96 Young J; Re Wellington 
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without challenge. 321 One would have expected a challenge if their standing was truly 
at issue. 
In the case of Lewis, the publishers Wilson & Horton challenged a suppression 
order by way of judicial review. The Court accepted that media organisations have 
standing to bring judicial review of an order, and that they do not have to have 
participated in the original determination of the order to seek review.322 The Court in 
Lewis assumed the media·s standing in summary proceedings. 323 It would be most 
undesirable if media organisations were denied standing, as their role as the public·s 
watchdog would be severely inhibited. 
B Publishing a Suppressed Name 
A breach of section 140 is an offence of strict liability.324 This means that 
prima facie liability is established by proving there was publication in contravention 
of a suppression order. The media organisation is liable unless they can prove a total 
absence of fault, on the balance of probabilities.325 In one case, a suppressed name 
was referred to in a court proceeding, with no mention of an earlier suppression order 
having been made. A reporter then innocently published the suppressed name and the 
defendant successfully relied on the total absence of fault defence.326 
Common unintentional slips such as ignorance of a suppression order or 
accidental publication of a suppressed name will be insufficient.327 Despite the small 
fine 328 for a breach of this section. and to the credit of media organisations, there are 
321 Wellington Nell'spapers Lid's Application, above n 318, Cooke J; Broadcasting Corporation of Ne11· 
Zealand I' Attorney-General. above n 195, Richardson J; TVNZ v R [ 1996] 3 NZLR 393 (CA) Keith J for 
the Court; Re Victim X, above n 56, Keith J for the Cou1i. 
322 le1l'is 1• Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 8, para 52 Elias CJ for the Court. 
323 le11•is v Wilson & Horton Ltd , above n 8, paras 69-70 Elias CJ for the Court. 
324 Karam 1• Solicitor General (20 August 1999) HC AK AP50 198, 8 Gendall J. 
325 A total absence of fault is shown by demonstrating that all reasonable care has been taken that a 
reasonable person would have taken in the circumstances: Karam v Solicitor General, above n 324, 8 
Gendall J, or by the journalist having acted '" ith honest) and due diligence: Police r Nell's Media Auckland 
Ltd [ 1998] OCR 440 Judge Nicholson QC. 
3
~
6 Police v Ne11·s Media Auckland Ltd, above n 326. 440 Judge Nicholson QC. 
m Police v Thames Star Co. Ltd ( 1965) 11 MCD 343. 
328 The fine is I ,OOO dollars: Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 140(5). 
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few cases of deliberate infringement. 329 A concerted attempt to flout the authority of 
the court could result in a contempt of court charge, in addition to a conviction under 
section 140.330 There is no authority for a contempt conviction under the current Act, 
but it occurred under previous legi slation. 331 
C Publishing Details 
In suppression cases there is a prohibition on publishing particulars likely to 
lead to the identification of the suppressed name. The Court of Appeal in R v W held 
that "'likely to lead'' signifies an appreciable risk that publication will have that 
effect.332 In R v W, a professional man, was found guilty of indecently assaulting a 15 
year old boy.333 As the boy had worked for W it was felt that publication of his name 
could lead to the boy's identification, which had to be protected by virtue of section 
139 of the Act.33-t 
The prohibition on publication applies to any report or account relating to 
proceedings.335 ·'Report or account relating to proceedings" is given a wide 
interpretation by the Courts. For example, a book describing the murder of a Dunedin 
family revealed a suppressed name and was held to be an account of proceedings.336 
There are some recent examples which show that media outlets are willing to 
publish a number of details about a person whose name is suppressed, arguably 
creating a real risk of identification. For example, in relation to the All Black case 
discussed above, The New Zealand Herald described the player as an ''A ll Black" and 
revealed that he had appeared in the Waitakere Violence Court. The paper said the 
'
29 See the discussion in Burrows and Wilson. above n 13, 21. 
33° Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 140. If a conviction was sustained for contempt, the financial penalty on 
media organisat ions would be much greater than the fine for breaching section 140 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1985. 
331 Attorney-Genera/ v Taylor& Another [1975] 2 1 ZLR 138 (SC) Beattie J. 
332 R v W [ 1998) I NZLR 35. 40 (CA) Richardson P. 
m R ,, W, above n 332, 35 Ri chardson P. 
:l:l-1 R ,, W, above n 332. 40 Richardson P. 
m Criminal Justice Act I 985, ss 139( I) , l 40( I). 
336 Karam,. Solicitor General, above n 324, 8 Gendall J. 
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player lived in West Auckland. was married and that his wife was 5 months pregnant 
at the time of the assault in October 2004. 337 By giving so many details about the 
player's marital status, family circumstances and place of residence the paper has 
come close to identifying the player. The number of players that would fit this 
description is smaiL so arguably there is an appreciable risk that identification could 
occur. 
Similarly, two celebrities were recently implicated in a drug scandal. Some 
media outlets described the individuals as ··former sports stars'.338 while others 
referred to them as ··television celebrities. ''339 It was also noted in some publications 
that the pair were overseas. 340 On the day the story broke, Radio New Zealand 
mentioned that the men in question were television celebrities and former sport stars, 
arguably creating a real risk of identification, as few people fit this description.3,. 1 
Even those outlets that just mentioned one of these key details may be 
treading too close to the line. This is because if these individual pieces of information 
are assimilated together, the number of people who fit this description is small, 
because of the size of New Zealand·s population. It would be na"ive of media 
organizations to assume that consumers ,, ill not put these descriptions together in 
order to try and ascertain identity. In the context of defamation , a defamatory 
meaning can be imputed to an otherwise innocent article, when read in light of other 
news media publications.3,.2 The same could apply to name suppression. The media 
should recognise that information put in the public domain by someone else may limit 
their own ability to publish further identifying information that, if put together with 
337 Carter, above n 254, A3. As the unable was unable to get a written decision it cannot be specified what 
the terms of the order were but it is likely that the order prohibited publication of the defendant's name, the 
victim's name or anything likely to identify the family: Stewart. above n 245, 3. 
m ··Sport Stars in Drug Bust'· (20 July 2005) The New Zealand Herald Auckland General News. 
339 Deborah Diaz ''TV Stars· link to drug Ring·· (20 July 2005) The Dominion Post Wellington Edition 2 I. 
340 ''TV Stars yet to contact Police·· (21 July 2005) The Dominion Post Wellington Edition 2 3. 
341 Radio New Zealand Newswire (20 July 2005) 06.27. 
'
42 It has been recognised that a newspaper could be successfully sued in respect ofa article that is 
defamatory when read in the light of prior news items publi hed b) other media. If such items can be 
regarded as part of the general knowledge of the community. they are arguably part of the context in which 
the latest contribution has been published: Astaire v Campling [ 1966] I WLR 34. 39 Sellers LJ, Hyams,. 
Peterson [ 1991] 3 ZLR 648 (CA) Cooke P for the Cow1. 
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the former information creates an appreciable risk of identification of the suppressed 
name.343 
In addition, by narrowing the pool of people with such a specific description, 
innocent people who hold the same characteristics become wrongly targeted, as 
occurred in this scandal.344 Such people have the option of pursing a defamation 
claim against anyone who has wrongly accused them. 
Many newspapers seem to have no hesitation in informing readers that 
suppressed names are available on the internet. The Dominion Post wrote in relation 
to the drug scandal ··Anyone keen on figuring out the identities of the two men can 
turn to the Internet where several possibilities are offered.'"345 Arguably. this 
constitutes an attempt to evade an order under section 140(5) of the Act.346 
D Consent 
An interesting question arises around whether there is an offence committed if 
the person whose name is suppressed consents to publication of their name. Strictly 
speaking, the subject of the suppression order is bound, just like anyone else by the 
prohibition on publication. However. a person is entitled to waive the protection of a 
statutory provision passed solely for their own benefit.347 onetheless, consent is 
rarely a defence to a criminal charge. so it seems unlikely that a court will hold that a 
provision that criminalises conduct could be waived in this manner. According to 
commentators "consent does not decriminalise the conduct, although in practical 
terms the likelihood of prosecution may be low."348 Media outlets who have obtained 
consent should apply to the court to vary the suppression order. 
343 See the discussion in Burrows and Cheer. above n 15. 40. 
344 
Former sportsman and television star fatthew Ridge was thought to be inrnlved in the scandal 
(particularly in internet gossip) and was not. 
145 
Rebecca Palmer '·Drug bust identities all over the net" (23 July 2005) The Dominion Post Wellington 
A3. 
346 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s l-t0(5). 
m Johnson 1' More/on [ 1980) AC 3 7. 
348 Burrows and Wi Ison, above n 13, 2::?.. 
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E Civil Remedies 
A further issue is whether a person whose name has been published in breach 
of a suppression order could sue for damages. 349 English authority has found against 
the existence of a civil remedy.350 To date, the matter has only been considered once 
in New Zealand at District Court level. Judge MacAskill found against the existence 
of a remedy arguing that the power to suppress names is to assist the justice system 
and that protection of privacy is merely a collateral effect.351 This is unpersuasive, 
given that suppression orders are given when the harm to reputation and privacy 
outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Clearly privacy considerations are 
· 35, important. -
The Judge was also concerned that a damages award may send a false 
message to the community that the offending was being indirectly rewarded and that 
there was no detriment to compensate if the published information was true .353 These 
reasons are only applicable where it is a convicted person's name that has been 
suppressed, but may not apply in cases where it is the victim who has received 
suppression or if an accused is acquitted. In this situation a right to privacy is more 
obviously at issue. In addition, finding against the existence of a civil remedy fails to 
give any weight to a person 's expectation that their name would remain anonymous 
3
"
9 The action could be for breach of statutory dut) or negligence. 
350 
The House of Lords has held that a breach of the non-publication provisions of mental health legislation 
confers no right to a civil c la im. But, the Court said that publication of unauthorised information about such 
proceedings is " incapable of causing loss or injury of a kind for which the law awards damages": Pickering 
v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Newspapers pie [ 199 I] 2 AC 370, 420 per Lord Bridge. However, this 
case is only authority for this particular statute and it is no longer true in New Zealand that a breach of 
privacy (which this case involves) is not an injury for which the court does not award damages: Hosking v 
R11nting [2005] I NZLR I, para 77 (CA) Gault P and Blanchard J. 
351 
Harrington v Wellington Neil'spapers Ltd (5 December 200 I) DC WN 869/00 Judge MacAskill. 
35
" MacAskill J also believed that the criminal sancti ons for breach ofa suppress ion order were sufficient to 
enforce compliance. There is a presumption that where the statute pro\'ides a remed), the duty is to be 
enforced using only the remedy pro\'ided in the statute, but that presumption is displaceable: Allorney-
General ,. Birkenhead Borough [ 1968] 1ZLR 383. 389 (SC) Richm ond J. An inquiry is made into the 
purpose of the statutory provision. Questions are asked as to whether the plaintiffs clearly fall within the 
class of persons which the statute is designed to protect, and whether the loss they sustained was of the type 
contemplated by the Act: MacEachern 1· Pukekohe Borough [ 1965] NZLR 330 (SC) Gresson J. Clearly, 
suppression orders do protect their recipients. The harm of publicity is being avoided by a suppression 
order and publicity is v. hat eventuates upon breach. 
353 Harrington v Wellington Nell'spapers Ltd. abo\e n 35 1, Judge MacAskill. 
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following the granting of a suppression order. Finding the existence of a remedy 
would also encourage journalists to act responsibly. The issue cannot be considered 
closed. 
XII THE INTERNET 
The Internet poses real problems for the practicality of suppression orders. For 
example, the name of the All Black who pleaded guilty to assaulting his pregnant 
wife was published on the internet. despite a suppression order prohibiting 
publication. 354 The identities of the celebrities involved in the drug scandal were 
described as ''New Zealand's worst-kept secret'·, due to the internet 355 However, the 
ease with which the correct names could be ascertained on the internet is debatable,356 
but undoubtedly there was plenty of speculation. 
When suppressed names are published on the internet the court's authority is 
being flouted. Interestingly, the Head of the Police's E-Crimes unit, Maarten 
Kleintjes, says that the police do not actively monitor the internet to search for name 
suppression breaches. 357 So not only are suppression orders not being adhered to. but 
there is no enforcement of them to encourage compliance. This raises questions about 
whether suppression orders are fruitless in a technological age. 
To date. some courts have rejected an argument that a suppression order 
should not be made because of the internet' s ability to render it futile. 358 Strictly 
speaking, an order should prevent release into cyberspace, as a ew Zealander would 
be in breach of an order if they pub I ished a suppressed name on a webpage. If a New 
Zealander leaks a suppressed name to a foreign newspaper, then this might not 
constitute ··publication .. of a suppressed name by the individual, as publication is by 
35
-1 Spratt, above n 178, 3. 
355 '·Drug bust identities all over the Net'", abo\ en 355. 
356 Price, above n 239, C6. 
357 
Although he concedes that if complaints were made they would be followed up: "Drug bust identities all 
over the Net", above n 355 . 
358 Le11·is 1· Wilson and Horton, above n 8 568 Elias CJ for the Court . 
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the newspaper. However, arguably such action does constitute evading or attempting 
to evade a court order, an offence under section 140(5) of the Act.359 
If a suppressed person's name appears on a webpage it seems likely that any 
New Zealand media outlet who directed its li steners or readers to that website could 
be considered to be attempting to evade the order under section 140(5).360 It is 
questionable how specific the direction would need to be. For example, one New 
Zealand newspaper referred to "A mass selling tabloid style ational British 
Newspaper" that had a suppressed name published on their webpage.361 The number 
of newspapers who fit this description is small, and the paper's direction is specific so 
arguably there is an attempt to evade the court order. 
If a suppressed name appears on an overseas website following the granting of 
an order by a ew Zealand court. this will generally be insufficient to warrant 
revoking it. For example, the victim of a kidnapping plot in 2002 had their name 
published on an overseas website, in breach of a suppression order.362 Hammond J 
held that as not all ew Zealanders had access to the internet and would even know 
where to find the information, the order could stand. The Judge took the vie,v that the 
Court should not let an otherwise appropriate order be entirely defeated by 
technology:363 
359 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 140(5). In theory. the overseas organisation could be in breach of New 
Zealand law because an act necessary for the completion of the offence, that is publication, occurs in ew 
Zealand: Burrows and Cheer, above n 15, 39. Jane Clifton wrote an article for The Times in wh ich she 
revealed the name ofa victim who was the target in kidnapping plot. Hi s name was suppressed. The article 
was put on the newspapers webpage: Times Online ""Britons accused of kidnap plot" (26 July 2002) 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/print/Friendly/0,, 1-3-365730,00.html> (last accessed 5 May 2005). 
An investigation was carried out as to whether to pro ecute Ms Cl ifton, but no charges appeared to proceed, 
which indicates that enforcement of internet breaches is limited. 
36° Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 140(5). 
361 Hank Schouten '"Lawyers win gag on kidnap target" (25 July 2002) The Dominion Post Wellington 
Edition 2 I. The article opened as follows: .. Millions of Britons knov. the identity of three men and the 
Wellington businessman they allegedly planned to kidnap but The Dominion Post cannot tell its readers. A 
mass-selling British tabloid newspaper not only named the suspected target, Mr X, but gave his financial 
details on its website." 
36
~ Re Victim X, above n 56, 228 Hammond J. 
163 Re Victim X, above n 56, 228 Hammond J. 
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As a matter of principle it would be quite wrong ifthe relevant information could be 
placed on the internet overseas and it was then used as a device to avoid or have set 
aside an order for suppression which had properly been made in ew Zealand. 
To allow otherwise would mean that the law was bending to technology and could 
encourage other stratagems in the future. The cou11s have recognised that if the 
identity of a person is already in the public domain, then suppression may be 
declined, as the law will not engage in an exercise offutility. 364 
Commentators are divided on the impact of the internet on suppression orders. 
David Farrar, Vice President of the Internet Society argues that technology is 
outstripping suppression orders, leaving them redundant. He says ··high-profile 
suppression cases can normally be found within hours of courts suppressing them."365 
Warren Young argues that "many more people" could read something on the front 
page of a newspaper than on a website. 366 Steven Price agrees that the cou11s are 
likely to recognise the difference between some lively internet gossip and nationwide 
media publicity, when deciding v\ hether orders are pointless. 367 
Arguably, reading a paper headline is easier than having to research on the 
internet and find out someone ' s name. Many people may not be interested enough to 
invest time and money in discovering the suppressed name. In addition, internet chat 
rooms are often rife with speculation about the identity of the suppressed name. 
Therefore, the internet is less authoritative than a newspaper or television broadcast; 
people may think they know who the suppressed identity is, but may be quite wrong. 
364 
Lell'is ,. Wilson and Horton, above n 8, 568 Elias CJ for the Court. One case where the Judge felt a 
suppression order was futile was in the recent .. Berryman Bridge" collapse case. There, Judge Wild ended 
suppression on a report by an army engineer which gave information about the bridge's construction. 
Justice Wild believed it was fruitless to keep the document suppressed, once it was widely available on 
websites. The Judge said he did not belie\e the cou11 was most effectively upholding the administration of 
justice by making "futile" and .. stupid" orders. The Judge stated .. I decline to be blind to the realities of the 
situation: David McLoughl in ··cou11 orders futile-judge" ( I 6 May 2005) The Dominion Post Wellington 
General News. 
Je,;; Mcloughlin, above n 364, General News. 
366 Mcloughlin , above n 364, General News. 
367 Price, above n 239, C6. 
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The number of people who have access to the internet is said to be close to 
75%.
368 
As this number increases and information becomes more easily accessible, 
judges may refuse outright or decline to renew suppression orders, because they 
consider them futile. When the number of people who have access to the internet and 
can easily find the information dramatically outweighs the small number who do not 
know, there is a limited interest to be protected by suppression. This is really only 
going to occur in cases involving celebrities and is not applicable to the majority of 
suppression decisions. because there is little public interest in them. 
XIII POSSIBLE REFORMS 
A Discretion versus Uniformity? 
Judges need to retain their discretion , given the importance of factual 
considerations in name suppression applications. The discretion is necessary so that a 
degree of flexibi I ity may also be sustained. Feedback to the Law Commission on 
this issue did not indicate a need to legislate to prescribe criteria to be taken into 
account for name suppression and generally was in support of the continued 
availability of suppression for defendants. 369 The necessary consequence of retaining 
discretion for judges is that a precarious balancing exercise occurs. As the facts of 
individual cases vary immensely, the combination of factors will produce different 
outcomes. Therefore, the appearance of inconsistency in suppression decisions to the 
casual observer may be explicable for this reason. This is enhanced by the fact that 
media reports do not usually canvass the complexities of a decision that a judge may 
well have considered. 
So, rather than strictly codifying the law it may be more advantageous to 
invest resources into training judges in hovv to deal with name suppression 
368 Mcloughlin , above n 364, General News. 
369 New Zealand Law Comm iss ion. above n 62. 313. 
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applications. At present, there is no formal system for training judges in this area;37° 
they are left to rely on case law. External vigilance may assist in gaining greater 
consistency in name suppression applications. 
B Suppression During Trial Process 
Of particular concern 1s the weight to be given to the presumption of 
111nocence before conviction, as was seen above. Because of this, it may be 
advantageous to reform the law of name suppression in the process leading up to trial. 
1 Before First Appearance 
It is unclear what the situation is if a media organisation publishes the name of 
a person who has been charged with an offence, but not yet appeared in court. There 
can be no charge for breach of section 140, because no suppression order exists. The 
principle of open justice does not apply, because the matter has yet to reach court. 
Arguably, the privacy interests of the person charged should be considered 
paramount.
371 
Pat Plunkett, an experienced journalist. states that he would publish a 
name before someone had appeared in cou11, even if he knew suppression was being 
' 7~ sought. J -
It is suggested that to publish a person's name in such circumstances may 
constitute contempt of court, because the media are effectively frustrating the court's 
ability to make an order and pre-empts a person's right to apply for one.373 Burrows 
argues that it may depend on the circumstances and the intent with which such a 
publication was made. If for example, "it"' as known that suppression was going to be 
applied for and there was a deliberate attempt to pre-empt any possible order that 
370 
The Judicial Studies Institute, who is responsible for training judges, has no training seminars 
concerning name suppression. 
371 New Zealand Law Commission , above n 62. 314. 
:m Mediawatch ··Comment: Name Suppression·· (9 September 200 I) <wwv. .mediawatch.co.nz/archive> 
(last accessed I O July 2005). 
373 C ,. Wilson & f-Jo/'/011 Ltd (27 May 1992) HC AK CP 765/92 Williams J. 
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could well be held to be contemptuous.''374 Conversely, the Law Commission says 
that although this conduct is undesirable it wouldn't be contemptuous, nor in breach 
of any code of practice.375 
Because of the uncertainty for media organisations, the Law Commission 
believes there should be a prohibition on the publication of identifying details of a 
person charged with an offence before he or she appears in court. 376 This would create 
certainty for both defendants and the media. The principle of open justice is not 
impeded and freedom of expression is only delayed. Friends and family can be 
informed of proceedings. 
2 Suppression until Conviction 
A further option would be to provide that an accused's name could not be 
published until conviction. This was the situation in ew Zealand from September 
1975 until July 1976.377 This treats the presumption of innocence principle as 
paramount. Gary Gotlieb, an Auckland lawyer, believes New Zealanders do not 
adhere to the innocent-until-proven-guilty principle and therefore supports this 
proposal: ''All you have to do is listen to talkback-if a person is charged they're 
guilty.'"378 
This approach also gives full weight to the reputation of the defendant and 
their family. and recognises the harmful consequences that merely being accused of a 
crime can have on an individual's livelihood. As Fisher J notes ''the stigma associated 
with a serious allegation will rarely be erased by a subsequent acquittal."379 This 
stance also recognises that publicity of an offender·s name should be used as a 
374 
Burrows and Wi Ison , above n 13, 22. 
'
75 
New Zealand Law Commission, above n 62. 314. 
376 
New Zealand Law Commission, above n 62, 314. 
377 
This approach lasted only until a change of government. The legislation provided exceptions to the 
prohibition on publication, such as if the accused did not desire suppression or if the public interest 
warranted publication: Criminal Justice Act 1954. ss -t58(2), (6). 
178 
"'Name Suppression to easily granted-law expert'·. abO\e n 9. 
379 M v Police, above n 4, 16 Fisher J. 
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punishment for their behavior and as a deterrent against future similar offending. A 
further benefit of this approach is certainty: every person accused of a crime would be 
treated the same, whereas the present practice is inconsistent with only some people 
likely to gain the advantage of keeping their name suppressed. 380 
However, this approach has attracted little support here or overseas and the 
Law Commission is not in favour of it. 381 This is because it fails to give any weight to 
freedom of expression or open justice. It would inhibit other victims or witnesses 
coming forward to assist in criminal proceedings. The Commission also notes the 
logistical problems: ··Giving the presumption of innocence such overriding force 
raises the considerable practical difficulty of making sure that the accompanying 
reporting of the trial process does not compromise the accused's anonymity."382 
3 Suppression until charges "gone into" 
A more moderate option would be to restrict publication until a certain point 
in the trial process. For example, the Law Commission believes that the current law 
relating to the pre-trial suppression of an accused's name gives insufficient 
recognition to the presumption of innocence. 383 Consequently, it recommends that 
after a person is charged publication of their name or particulars should be prohibited 
unti I the substance of the case is ··gone into'· by the court. 33-1 The rule of suppression 
would be presumptive only and the court could vary it if the interests of justice 
required it, such as if other innocent people were suffering because of speculation 
about the accused's identity. 385 
380 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 62, 317. 
381 New Zealand Law Commission, abm en 62 , 317. 
18
" New Zealand La\.\ Commission, abme n 62 , 317. 
383 lew Zealand La\.\ Commission, abo\'e n 62, 316. 
384 In a summary case, a case would be ··gone into" when the prosecution pre ented its case or the accused 
pied guilty. In indictable cases it would occur at the time of depositions at a preliminary hearing: New 
Zealand Law Commission. above n 62, 317. The majority of the Criminal Law Reform Committee 
suggested this proposal in 197'2: Criminal Law Reform Committee The Suppression of Publication of Name 
of the Accused (Wellington, 1972). 
385 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 62. 317. 
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This would ensure that all persons appearing before the court are treated 
equally, so far as publication of their name is concerned. Publication of an accused's 
name under the present law often depends on matters of chance, such as whether the 
media are present court at the appropriate time. 386 In small centers a local newspaper 
may publish the names of all those appearing in court, even those on minor traffic 
offences. In the larger cities, sheer volume means selective reporting takes place. 
The Commission·s approach would also avoid the dilemma that presently 
faces an accused seeking name suppression .. knowing that the threshold to be met is a 
high one and the possibility that the application itself, if unsuccessful, may attract the 
very consequence it sought to avoid.',387 This approach would give certainty for 
media outlets and defendants and would resolve the problems with the weight to be 
accorded to the presumption of innocence pre-trial. 
There are disadvantages with such an approach. Only partial weight is given 
to the presumption of innocence, because suppression ends before conviction. An 
individual acquitted of a charge would be in the same position as they are under the 
present law.
388 
The limits placed on freedom of expression will have to shown to be 
demonstrably justified, but this is not an insurmountable challenge. The public·s right 
to know the identity of a person appearing the court is simply postponed until the 
substance of a case is presented to the court. This approach gives a degree of certainty 
for those seeking interim name suppression and avoids many of the problems 
. d . h I . f . 389 associate wit t 1e presumption o 111nocence. 
C Victims 
There are also problems with the treatment of victims in criminal proceedings. 
Presently. there is an automatic prohibition on the publication of the names of victims 
386 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 62. 3 16 
387 
New Zealand Law Commission, above n 62. 316. 
388 
New Zealand Law Commi ssion, above n 62. 316. 
389 
If further name suppression was sought then the current high threshold should be met. 
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of sexual offences. 390 In addition. the court holds discretionary powers of suppression 
for victim's names.39 1 The Court of Appeal has held that the threshold for name 
suppression for victims is the same as for defendants. Victims must show "compelling 
reasons'' to justify overriding the open justice presumption.392 It has been held that 
circumstances warranting suppression may exist if the victims of an offence or their 
families are in physical jeopardy.393 
The rationale underlying the open justice principle arguably does not apply 
with the same force to victims. as it does for the accused. The public has an interest in 
ensuring justice is dispensed fairly, a consideration which does not apply to victims. 
Defendants are said to have caused the criminal situation while victims voluntarily 
appear (or are sometimes subpoenaed). They are then forced to recount often painful 
and traumatic experiences. 
The importance of victims participating in the New Zealand justice system is 
beyond question. It is undesirable that potential victims may be dissuaded from 
participating in court proceedings because of a fear of being publicly exposed. As the 
Law Commission notes: 394 
The comfort of knowing that particulars of their identity would not be published if 
there were reasonable grounds for such a request would indicate that the law 
recognised the value of their participation and had some flexibility with respect to 
their personal wishes as to name suppression. 
Also, there should be some weight given to the privacy values of victims who may 
wish to remain anonymous for good reason. 395 
39° Criminal Justice Act 1985. s 139A. 
391 Criminal Justice Act, s 140. 
39
~ Re Victim X, abo, en 56, 238 Keith J for the Court. 
393 R v Kaloi [2004] OCR 128, 133 Judge Roderick Joyce QC. 
m New Zealand Law Commission, above n 62, 319. 
395 
For example. in Re Victim X the victim of an attempted kidnapping case desired suppression. This was 
understandable given the harm and distress caused to the victim and his family by the defendant's actions. 
However, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge and refused continuing suppression: Re Victim X, 
above n 56, 242 Keith J for the Court. 
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The Law Commission believes that suppression for victims warrants 
reforming and argues for a new presumption in favour of suppression for them: "We 
(the Commission) propose such an order should be made at a victim's request unless 
the interests of justice require otherwise."396 In contrast, Burrows believes that 
victims should not receive suppression, because of the fact that it may make cases 
difficult to report and the publication of victims flushes out witnesses.397 This seems 
unpersuasive, given that descriptions of victims could still be published for the 
purposes of reporting cases and details of the crime could be published so that 
witnesses come forwards. 
The Law Commission's approach seems appropriate, given the increasing 
developments in New Zealand to recognise privacy rights398 and the lack of 
justifications in treating victims the same as defendants. If it can be shown that 
suppression is necessary in order to encourage the public to pa11icipate in the justice 
process, the limits placed on freedom of expression may be shown to be demonstrably 
justified. It is worth remembering that under the Commission's recommendations the 
cou11 may order the publication of a victim's name ifrendered necessary. 399 
Unfortunately, the Commission's views are unlike!) to be enacted in the near 
future. The current Government has recently rejected all of the Commission's 
suggestions: ·'The present laws are based on the assumption of open justice, with 
exceptions made where appropriate. The Government considers that the existing laws 
I · . . ,,.ioo re at1ng to name suppression are appropriate. 
196 
New Zealand Law Commission. above n 62 , 319. 
397 
Anthony Davies "Law Commission again fails to grasp media's role·· (24 March 2004) The Independent 
Auckland 18. 
398 
Section 7 of the Victim ·s Rights Act 2002 recognises the victim ·s right to privacy. Section 139( I A)of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1985 states that the automatic suppression orders for victims of sexual offences are 
there solely for their protection. The majority of the Court of Appeal in Hosking v R11nting, recently 
recognised the tort of privacy: above n 350. 
399 
New Zealand Law Commission, above n 62 , 319 . 
. wo Ministry of Justice .. Government Response to Law Commission Repo11 on Delivering Justice For Alt' 
(13 September 2004) 53. 
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XIII/ CONCL US/ON 
While the Cou11 of Appeal has laid out general principles that a judge must 
consider when suppressing a defendant's name. much is left to discretion. This is 
appropriate given the variable circumstances involved in suppression cases. However, 
judges need to receive greater training about name suppression to ensure consistency 
in their decisions; otherwise the public will lose faith in the judiciary. Chief District 
Court Judge Russell Johnson's comments that ·'Judges are human and humans can be 
fallible; that's why we have rights of appear·40 1 are unlikely to restore public 
confidence. 
Overall , it does not appear that name suppression is granted too frequent ly, 
given that permanent name suppression is issued in under l % of cases, the majority of 
which are automatic orders.40~ Instead. there are pockets of concern, such as the 
ability of celebrities to have their names suppressed. because of the likelihood of 
damaging publicity. This courf s approach means that there is an inequality in how 
people are treated before the law. The inability of judges to reconcile the presumption 
of innocence with the principle of open justice also needs addressing. as different 
judges accord varying weight to this presumption, which leads to uncertain results for 
defendants and the media. By prohibiting publication until the charges have been 
"'gone into" by the court some uniformity v,,ill be achieved. 
The Court of Appeal's test that only when the harm from publicity will 
outweigh the offence involved and is di sproportionate to the public interest that 
suppression should be granted is appropriate, but needs to be more firmly followed by 
the lower courts. More consideration needs to be paid to determining whether the 
limits placed on freedom of expression are justified. By granting name suppression 
the force of public opinion is being prevented from operating, so it should be only in 
-1oi Boyes, above 11 9, A2. 
-1o2 Mi11istr) of Justice, abo\e 11 51 , Table 2. 
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select circumstances that suppression should be granted. At all other times, the 
principle should be to name defendants and shame them. 
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XVI APPENDIX 
Table I shows the numbers of cases resulting in a name suppression order over the period 
1995 to 2004, controlling for the type of offence that the offender was convicted for. 
Unfortunately we cannot distinguish between interim and final name suppression and it is 
likely that these figures include both types. 
Table I: Number of convicted cases involving an order for name suppression, 1995 to 
2004, by type of offence<3l 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 200-1-
Sexual violence (1) 102 103 78 -1 60 S2 51 6-1- 82 97 
Other violence 192 199 1-1--1- 1-1-6 128 116 113 69 86 128 
Other sexual (2) -,., :,_ ") .)_ -1-2 r 16 23 l7 18 T 31 
Other against 22 12 8 9 JO 6 8 7 9 16 
persons 
Property l T 1-1-2 112 133 73 79 69 79 90 95 
Drug T -1-2 19 7~ _.) 18 20 22 16 13 31 
Against Justice 16 26 12 27 r _:, 19 19 22 21 22 
Good order 31 16 18 17 13 13 22 10 11 19 
Traffic ?' _ :, 22 33 20 13 13 1- 17 13 22 
Miscellaneous 13 21 1-1- 22 16 16 1- 14 r _:, 22 
Total 607 615 -1-80 505 ~-,., .) - 35~ 355 316 377 -1-83 
Notes: 
(1) Rape, unlawful sexual connection, indecent assault, and attempted sexual violation. 
(2) Sexual offences against the person for which it is not possible to know from the offence 
description whether they involved violence. These offences include: incest and doing an indecent 
act. 
(3) This data has been subject to revision due to things uch as recording practice changes. 
The percentage of convicted offences of each type which resulted in an order for name 
suppression is summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2: Percentage Number of convicted cases involving an order for name suppression, 
1995 to 2004, b~ tn~e of offence< 1) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Sexual violence 14.6 14.8 12.9 12.4 10.6 10.2 10.2 12.2 15.4 20.0 
Other violence 1.8 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.3 
Other sexual 18.3 11 .8 17.5 16.4 8.0 10.7 8.1 9.2 13.0 16.4 
Other against persons 1.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.0 
Property 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Drug 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 
Against Justice 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Good order 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Traffic 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Miscellaneous 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 
1otes: 
( 1) This data has been subject to revision due to things such as recording practice changes. 
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